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Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction
and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of in-
dividuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction
effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other op-
tionsinthechoiceset. Thispaperarguesthatbotheffectsmayresultfromanindi-
vidual’s attempt to overcome the difﬁculty of making a choice in the absence of a
single criterion for ranking the options. Moreover, we propose to view the resolu-
tion of this choice problem as a cooperative solution to an intrapersonal bargain-
ing problem among different selves of an individual, where each self represents a
different criterion for choosing. We ﬁrst identify a set of properties that charac-
terize those choice correspondences that coincide with our bargaining solution,
for some pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed-preference
foundation to our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these
two preference relations can be uniquely identiﬁed.
Alternatively, our analysis may be reinterpreted as a study of (interpersonal)
bilateral bargaining over a ﬁnite set of options. In that case, our results provide
a new characterization, as well as testable implications, of an ordinal bargaining
solution that is previously discussed in the literature under the various names of
fallback bargaining, unanimity compromise, Rawlsian arbitration rule, and Kant–
Rawls social compromise.
Keywords. Behavioral economics, attraction and compromise effects,
bargaining.
JEL classification. D01, D03, C78, J52.
1. Introduction
Many of the decision problems we face are complicated by the fact that there is no sin-
gle dimension or criterion for evaluating the available alternatives. For example, when
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searching for an apartment or a house, the ranking of the available options may be very
different depending on whether the criterion we use is price, size, proximity to work, or
quality of schools. Similarly, when choosing a car, there are several different criteria or
dimensions that one may use such as price, safety, gas efﬁciency, size, color, and esthet-
ics. Also, in deciding between academic job offers, there is no one obvious criterion to
use,asonemayconsidertherankingofthedepartment,thenumberoffacultymembers
in one’s ﬁeld, the ﬁnancial terms, the location, etc. Often there can be many different di-
mensions or criteria that one may use, making it difﬁcult, if not impossible, to take all
of them into account. This often leads us to focus only on a limited number of dimen-
sions, which we deem most important. However, we are still faced with the difﬁcult task
of resolving the trade-off between these dimensions.
Evidence from numerous studies in economics, psychology, and marketing suggests
that individuals often ﬁnd it difﬁcult to resolve the conﬂict about how much of one
dimension to trade off in favor of another, and they typically tend to resort to simple
heuristics that lead to systematic violations of rationality. One common heuristic is
known as reason-based choice (see Simonson 1989, Tversky and Shaﬁr 1992,a n dShaﬁr
et al. 1993): in the absence of a single criterion for ranking available options (what is of-
tenreferredtoas“choiceunderconﬂict”),choicesmaybeexplained“intermsofthebal-
ance of reasons for and against the various alternatives” (see Shaﬁr et al. 1993). Accord-
ing to this heuristic, “relations among alternatives in choice sets may inﬂuence choice
by providing reasons for preferring certain alternatives over others” (Simonson 1989).
Consequently, reason-based choice may lead to systematic violations of the weak axiom
of revealed preferences (WARP).
Among the most studied and robust violations are the attraction and the compro-
miseeffects. TheattractioneffectwasﬁrstdemonstratedbyHuberetal.(1982),whilethe
compromise effect was introduced by Simonson (1989).1 The attraction effect refers to
theabilityofanasymmetricallydominatedorrelativelyinferioralternative,whenadded
to a set, to increase the choice probability of the dominating alternative. The compro-
miseeffectreferstotheabilityofan“extreme”(butnotinferior) alternative, whenadded
to a set, to increase the choice probability of an “intermediate” alternative. To illustrate
these two effects, consider two options, A and B. Suppose there are two dimensions or
criteria for evaluating these options such that B is better than A along the ﬁrst dimen-
sion while A is better than B along the second dimension (see Figure 1). For example,
suppose A and B are two equally priced apartments, but one is closer to work while the
other has better schools.
In a typical experimental study, both A and B are chosen—usually in equal propor-
tions—by a control group of subjects. The attraction effect is observed when a third
alternative, C, is added to the set such that it is dominated by only one of the other two
options (say, B,a si nFigure 1). When subjects are asked to choose from {A B C},t h e
vast majority of them tend to choose B. The compromise effect occurs when C is added
such that it is even better than B along the ﬁrst dimension, but worse than it along the
1These studies spawned a whole literature devoted to replicating and extending these effects to various
decision problems, including real, monetary choices. For references, see Shaﬁr et al. (1993), Kivetz et al.
(2004a, 2004b), and Ariely (2008).Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Reason-based choice 127
Figure 1. Attraction and compromise effects.
seconddimension(i.e.,accordingtotheﬁrstdimension, C isbetterthanB,whichisbet-
ter than A, while the opposite ranking is obtained according to the second dimension).
In such a case, most subjects again tend to pick B. These ﬁndings may be interpreted as
systematic violations of the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) by considering
a choice correspondence that selects both A and B from {A B}, but chooses B alone
from {A B C}.2 The introduction of these two effects has generated a huge literature
in marketing aimed at understanding the source of the effects and their implications
for positioning, branding, and advertising (see Kivetz et al. 2004a, 2004b). The common
consensus among psychologists is that the attraction and compromise effects are not
two separate phenomena, but rather two manifestations of the same heuristic, mainly,
reason-based choice. Indeed, in the seminal study by Simonson (1989), the same group
of subjects exhibited both effects in roughly the same magnitude.
This paper proposes and characterizes a model of reason-based choice that gener-
ates both the attraction and the compromise effects. We envision the decision-maker as
trying to reach a compromise between conﬂicting “inner selves,” representing the dif-
ferent attributes or dimensions of the available options. We then propose to view the
ﬁnal choice (i.e., the “balancing of reasons for and against”) as a cooperative solution to
a bargaining among the different selves. In the spirit of the literature on dual selves (e.g.,
the β − δ models of present bias, Bernheim and Rangel 2004, Benhabib and Bisin 2005,
Eliaz and Spiegler 2006, Fudenberg and Levine 2006), most of our analysis focuses on
behavior that may be explained with at most two selves.
We start by considering the two relevant criteria or dimensions, and their associated
rankings (which may be identical), as primitives of the model (e.g., think of choosing
among products with two attributes such as price and quality, price and size, shipping
rate and date of arrival, sugar and fat content, etc.). Formally, our ﬁrst model consists
of a ﬁnite set of options X and a pair of linear orderings on this set,  =( 1  2).E a c h
ordering is interpreted as the (known) preference relation of one of the individual’s dual
selves. A bargaining problem is deﬁned to be a nonempty subset of options S.F o r a
given preference proﬁle  , a bargaining solution is a correspondence C  that associates
with every bargaining problem S as u b s e to fS.
Which cooperative bargaining solution can capture our dual-self interpretation of
reason-based choice? Our ﬁrst main result (Theorem 1) establishes the existence of a
2More speciﬁcally, this is a violation of the β axiom proposed by Sen (1971).128 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
unique bargaining solution that captures—and extends—the attraction and compro-
mise effects (properties we call attraction and no better compromise), in addition to a
number of other properties that capture a notion of consistency across decision prob-
lems, the cooperative nature of the bargaining, immunity to framing, and symmetry.
To describe this solution, imagine that for every bargaining problem, each bargainer
assigns each option a score equal to the number of elements in its lower contour set.
Hence, each option is associated with a pair of scores. The bargaining solution selects
the options whose minimal score is highest. This solution previously is discussed in the
literature under various names: Rawlsian arbitration rule (Sprumont 1993), Kant–Rawls
social compromise (Hurwicz and Sertel 1997), and fallback bargaining (Brams and Kil-
gour 2001), as well as unanimity compromise (Kıbrıs and Sertel 2007). In contrast to
the Nash or Kalai–Smordinsky solutions, this bargaining solution is purely ordinal and
applies to any arbitrary ﬁnite set of options.3
Next we consider an environment in which there is no obvious way to rank the op-
tions along two dimensions. We interpret our focus on only two dimensions as an as-
sumption that the decision-maker can process only a limited number of dimensions or
attributes. Thus, if the options are characterized by a large number of attributes, it may
not be clear which two dimensions the decision-maker focuses on. Hence, an outside
observer may not be able to infer what rankings the decision-maker uses to evaluate the
options. Alternatively, there may be only two salient dimensions or attributes, but it is
not obvious how a decision-maker ranks the options along each dimension (consider,
for example, attributes such as color, taste, and smell). In such an environment, the
only observations we may have about the decision-maker are the choices he makes (i.e.,
his choice correspondence). We ask the question, What are the necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for representing the decision-maker as if he has two selves (each character-
ized by a linear ordering on X), which make a choice according to the fallback bargain-
ing solution?
Our second main result (Theorem 2) identiﬁes these conditions. This result relies
on the notions of “revealed Pareto dominance” and “revealed compromises.” An option
x is revealed to be Pareto superior to y if it is chosen over y in a pairwise comparison.
An option y is revealed to be a compromise between x and z if no option in this triplet
is revealed to be Pareto superior over another and y is chosen uniquely from {x y z}.
The necessary and sufﬁcient conditions identiﬁed in Theorem 2 include the revealed
versions of the relevant properties characterized in Theorem 1, in addition to proper-
ties that capture the consistency of the revealed Pareto relation and the consistency of
revealed compromises.
We next address the question of “identiﬁability”: to what extent can we identify the
set of preference proﬁles that are compatible with the observed choices? Clearly, ex-
changing the rankings between the two selves does not affect the bargaining solution.
Theorem 3 argues that there is a sense in which any further multiplicity is with respect
to “irrelevant alternatives.” This means that for any given bargaining problem S,w ec a n
3Mariotti(1998)proposesanextensionoftheNashbargainingsolutiontoﬁniteenvironments. However,
the extended solution still uses cardinal information as it is deﬁned over sets of payoff vectors.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Reason-based choice 129
pin down the pair of preferences over the minimal set of options that Pareto dominate
any option outside this set.
So far, we have interpreted our choice procedure as a solution to an intrapersonal
bargaining problem. Alternatively, we may interpret it as a solution to an interpersonal
bargaining problem where two distinct individuals need to agree on an option. While
mostofthechoicetheoreticliteratureaimstocharacterizetestableimplicationsofmod-
els of individual decision-making, the same set of tools may be applied to models of
collective decision-making. Since many collective decisions are achieved through bar-
gaining, it seems important to identify the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for in-
ferring the bargainers’ preferences and for modeling their decisions as an outcome of
cooperative bargaining. This paper takes a ﬁrst step in this direction by studying situa-
tions in which two individuals bargain over some ﬁnite, arbitrary set of alternatives. We,
therefore, focus on ordinal bargaining solutions on ﬁnite domains. Among such solu-
tions, the fallback bargaining solution receives much attention in the literature. More-
over, this solution has a simple non-cooperative foundation, which is similar in spirit to
Rubinstein’s (1982) alternative-offer game. Theorems 2 and 3 then provide testable im-
plications of the fallback solution and characterize the extent to which the bargainers’
preferences may be recovered from the data.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows. Therelatedliteratureisdiscussedinthe
next section. Section 3 deﬁnes the basic concepts and notation. This is followed by an
axiomatic characterization of the fallback solution for known preferences in Section 4.
The revealed-preference analysis of this solution is presented in Section 5. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 discusses possible extensions and provides some concluding remarks.
2. Relation to the literature
In relation to the literature, our paper makes the following contributions. First, we pro-
pose a single model that “explains” both the attraction and the compromise effects,
and we characterize its testable implications. Second, we provide a revealed-preference
foundation for a dual-self model in which the selves strive to reach compromise rather
than to behave non-cooperatively. Third, our axiomatic characterization also provides a
revealed-preference foundation for a cooperative bargaining solution. To better assess
these contributions, we discuss below some of the related papers in the literature.
Explaining attraction and compromise
A number of recent papers propose formal models that explain either the attraction ef-
fect or the compromise effect. However, there is no single model in this literature that
generates both effects in a single-person decision problem (such as those encountered
in the experiments that document these effects). Ok et al. (2011) relax the weak axiom
of revealed preferences to allow for choice behavior that exhibits the attraction effect,
but not the compromise effect. They propose a reference-dependent choice model in
which, given a choice problem S, the decision-maker maximizes a real function u over
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utility functions u. This choice procedure may be interpreted as a bargaining problem
with a continuum of bargainers and a disagreement point r(S), where the solution max-
imizes a social welfare function (SWF) u over the set of options that are “individually
rational.” The authors characterize necessary and sufﬁcient conditions on choice data
to be consistent with some bargaining model (r u u). One of these conditions, labeled
reference-dependent WARP , rules out the compromise effect.4
The attraction effect is also addressed in Lombardi (2009), which axiomatizes the
following choice procedure. Given a set of options, the decision-maker ﬁrst removes
elements that are dominated according to a ﬁxed, possibly incomplete, preference re-
lation. From the remaining options, the decision-maker eliminates those alternatives
whose lower contour set is strictly contained in that of another remaining option. Un-
like our model, this choice procedure does not explain the compromise effect and may
end up choosing the entire choice set.
In the marketing literature, Kivetz et al. (2004a, 2004b) argue that individuals may
exhibit the compromise effect when choosing among multiattribute options because of
theruletheyusetoaggregatethedifferentsubjectivevaluestheyassigntotheattributes.
The authors propose several functional forms of aggregation rules that can generate the
compromise effect and test the predictions of these functions on experimental data.
Their framework, unlike ours, is cardinal in nature and assumes a particular structure
on the set of options. Depending on parameter values and on the distance between op-
tions, some of the functions proposed by Kivetz et al. (2004a, 2004b) may also generate
some instances of an attraction effect. In contrast, our decision-making model always
generates both attraction and compromise effects for any arbitrary, ﬁnite set of options.
Furthermore, we characterize the testable implications of our model and the necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions for identifying its primitives from choice data.
Kamenica (2008) provides a novel argument that in a monopolistic market with
enough uninformed but rational consumers, there are some conditions that guaran-
tee the existence of equilibria in which the uninformed consumers exhibit the com-
promise effect, or the attraction effect, with positive probability. While this argu-
ment suggests an original interpretation of why consumers in a market may exhibit
compromise/attraction-like behavior, thereare many instances—such as the numerous
experiments that document the compromise and attraction effects—in which individu-
als consistently exhibit these effects outside the market when they are not engaged in a
non-cooperative game against some seller.
Rationalization via aggregation of multiple rationales
A few recent papers propose to model systematic violations of IIA as the result of a
choice procedure that aggregates multiple orderings (“rationales”) on the set of alter-
natives. Ambrus and Rozen (2009) investigate what choice functions are rationalizable
4To see this, recall that the compromise effect means that whenever the choice out of any pair in {x y z}
is the pair itself, then only a single element is chosen from the triplet. Suppose y is chosen. If the choice
correspondencesatisﬁes“reference-dependentWARP ,”theneitherxorz actasa“potentialreferencepoint”
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with a given social welfare function and a given number of selves. For a wide class of so-
cial welfare functions, they provide a condition on the number of selves that renders the
modeldevoidoftestableimplication. GreenandHojman (2007)proposeawelfarecrite-
rionforevaluatingirrationalchoices, bymodelingthesechoicesasreﬂectingaweighted
aggregation of all possible strict orderings on the set of options. In contrast to us, this
study is not concerned with deriving testable implications and focus on a different set
of questions than we do.5
Testable implications of collective decision-making
Finally,ourpaperisrelatedtoasmallbutgrowingliteraturethataimstoprovidetestable
implications for models of collective decision-making. Among those papers that em-
ploy a revealed-preference methodology, the most closely related are Sprumont (2000)
and Eliaz et al. (2011). The former provides a choice theoretic characterization of Nash
equilibrium and the Pareto correspondence, while the latter characterizes the choice
correspondence that selects the top element(s) of two preference orderings.
A number of other papers explore similar questions but without employing a
revealed-preference methodology. Chiappori (1988) characterizes the conditions under
which it is possible to recover the preferences and decision process of two individuals,
who consume leisure and some Hicksian composite good, from observations on their
labor supply functions. Chiappori and Ekeland (2009)e x t e n dt h i sa n a l y s i sa n dc h a r a c -
terize the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for recovering the individual preferences
of a group of individuals from observations on their aggregate consumption and the
common budget constraint that they face. Chiappori et al. (forthcoming)a n a l y z et h e
testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution in an environment where two in-
dividualsneedtoagreeontheallocationofapieamongthemselvesandwheredisagree-
ment leads each to receive some reservation payment. In a similar vein, Chambers and
Echenique (2009) study the testable implications of the standard model of two-sided
markets with transfers and characterize the sets of matchings that may be generated by
the model.
3. Definitions
Denote the ﬁnite set of all potential options as X.Abargaining problem is a subset of X.
A bargaining solution C associates to each bargaining problem S an o n e m p t ys u b s e t
C(S)of S. A (strict) linear ordering on X is a relation deﬁned on X ×X that is complete,
transitive, and antireﬂexive. The set of all possible linear orderings is denoted L(X).
Let  =( 1  2) ∈ L(X)2 and let S be a bargaining problem. Thescore of x in S along
dimension i (i = 1 or 2) is the number of feasible options that are (strictly) worse than x
for  i:
si(x S  ) =| { y ∈ S | x  i y}| 
5There is also a number of choice theoretic papers that proposes to rationalize irrational behavior using
procedures that rely—but do not aggregate—on multiple (not necessarily complete) binary relations. See,
e.g., Kalai et al. (2002), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), and Cherepanov et al. (2008).132 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Figure 2. Attraction and compromise effects as consequence of the fallback solution.
The fallback bargaining solution C
f
  associated with   assigns to each bargaining prob-
lem S the set of options in S that maximize the minimum (over i = 1 2)o ft h es c o r e s :
C
f




si(x S  ) 
Our ﬁrst characterization of the fallback bargaining involves regularity conditions
relating various bargaining solutions that can be indexed by a pair of linear orderings
as these two underlying preferences change. A bargaining operator is a function C that
associates a bargaining solution C( ) to each pair  =( 1  2) of linear orderings on X.
The image C( ) of the bargaining operator associated to   is denoted C  from now on
and the fallback bargaining operator is denoted Cf.
As pointed out in the Introduction, the fallback bargaining solution already appears
under various names in the literature on interpersonal bargaining (Sprumont 1993,
Hurwicz and Sertel 1997, Brams and Kilgour 2001, Kıbrıs and Sertel 2007). The termi-
nology of fallback bargaining is taken from Brams and Kilgour (2001), where they of-
fer a nice reinterpretation of the solution. For each bargaining problem S,a n de a c h
integer between 1 and |S|,l e tEi(S k) be the set of k best options in S according
to i’s preferences. Let k∗ be the smallest k such that E1(S k) ∩ E2(S k)  = ∅.T h e n
C
f
 (S) = E1(S k∗)∩E2(S k∗).
In other words, if both criteria agree on what the best option is, then it is the solu-
tion. Otherwise, the decision-maker looks for option(s) that would be ranked either top
or second-best by both criteria. If no option satisﬁes this property, then the decision-
maker iterates the procedure by allowing for third-best alternatives, and so forth. This
simple algorithm for deriving the elements in the solution illustrates the appeal of the
fallback solution as a descriptive model of multicriteria decision-making.
Figure 2 illustrates how the fallback solution generates the attraction and compro-
mise effects. In both cases, both A and B get a minimal score of 0 if C is not available.
Adding C changes the scores, and B now gets the largest minimal score in both cases. It
thus becomes selected uniquely by the fallback solution.
ItisalsointerestingtonotethatinthespiritoftheNashprogram,fallbackbargaining
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the available options as a possible agreement. If the responder accepts, the game ends
and the proposed option is adopted. If the responder rejects, the proposed option is
removed from the set and the responder now proposes one of the remaining options.
The game continues until either an agreement is reached or there remains only a single
option, which is then adopted. Anbarci (2006) shows that the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium of this game is an element in C
f
 (S).
The fallback solution applies an egalitarian criterion to a canonical representation
of the ordinal preferences. It is interesting to think about applying a utilitarian criterion,
which selects the set of elements
argmax
x∈S
[s1(x S  )+s2(x S  )] 
Note that this solution has two important shortcomings. First, it selects all the elements
of S whenever they are all Pareto optimal for the pair of orderings ( 1  2), and hence
does not capture the compromise effect. Second, in contrast to the fallback solution,
the Borda rule is not robust to common monotonic transformations of the bargainers’
ordinal preferences in the sense that it is sensitive to how the score of an option changes
as it moves up in the ranking (cf. scoring rules).
4. Preference-based axiomatic characterization
The aim of this section is to establish that the fallback bargaining operator is the unique
operator to captures a number of desiderata. First, its associated bargaining solutions
should exhibit properties that capture a plausible interpretation of attraction and com-
promise. Second, we should be able to interpret those solutions as a “procedurally
rational” heuristic. Thus, they should exhibit some form of consistency across deci-
sion/bargaining problems. Third, the solutions should capture our idea that the bar-
gaining among the selves is in some sense “cooperative.” Finally, we wish to interpret all
the options selected by the solutions (i.e., any “agreement” reached by the two selves) as
being on “equal footing” in terms of their desirability and robustness to small changes
in the bargaining problem.
We focus our attention on a class of bargaining operators, which satisfy some basic
properties from axiomatic bargaining and social choice. This allows us to meaningfully
interpret the associated correspondences C  as a bargaining solution.6 Speciﬁcally, a
bargaining operator C is regular if the following conditions hold.
1. It is neutral in the sense of not having an a priori bias in favor or against some
elements of X.L e tg:X → X be an isomorphism. Then Cg( )(g(S)) = g(C (S)),
where g(S) ={ g(x) | x ∈ S} and g( ) ∈ L(X)2 is such that xg i( )yif and only if
g−1(x)  i g−1(y) for all x y ∈ X and both i ∈{ 1 2}.
2. It is anonymous in the sense that it treats both orderings with equal relevance:
C( 2  1)(S) = C( 1  2)(S).
6Recall that we denote the image of   under the bargaining operator C by C  instead of C( ).134 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
3. Options are selected using only the parts of the two orderings that are relevant to
the problem. If    is an alternative pair of linear orderings (deﬁned on X)t h a t
coincide with   on S ×S,t h e nC  (S) = C (S).7
It is certainly of interest to investigate how our theory adapts if one eliminates some
or all of these properties. Dropping neutrality allows us to accommodate some framing
effects, where the label of the available options may inﬂuence the choice (e.g., options
are presented in a list or are offered by trademarks with varying impact, etc.). Dropping
the second property adds the possibility of one of the two criteria being more relevant
than the other (e.g., caring more about the size of the car than its color). Dropping the
third property allows us to consider choice procedures where the decision-maker is in-
ﬂuenced by options he aspires to, but cannot afford. Yet, we believe that one must ﬁrst
understand the attraction and compromise effects in their purest form, in the absence
of all these additional features. The regularity property thus deﬁnes a benchmark that
can be used to build more elaborate theories.
Contrary to the regularity conditions, our main axioms do not involve restrictions
on the bargaining operator as the underlying pair of preferences change. Hence, they
are imposed for all the bargaining solutions in the image of the operator. They are thus
assumed to be valid for each  ∈L(X)2 and each S ⊆ X.
Attraction (ATT). Let x ∈ X \ S be such that y   x for some y ∈ C (S).T h e n
C (S ∪{x}) ={ y ∈ C (S) | y   x}.8
Attractionformalizestheideathataddingadominatedalternativereinforcestheap-
peal ofanoption tothedecision-maker. This property is bestunderstood bydecompos-
ing it into two parts. First, whenever option x is added to a set S, it seems reasonable
to expect that the set of options that were previously selected, and which dominate x,
continue to be chosen, i.e., {y ∈ C (S) | y   x}⊆C (S ∪{ x}). We view the attraction ef-
fectastheconverseinclusion, C (S∪{x}) ⊆{ y ∈ C (S) | y   x}, i.e., whenchoosingfrom
the new set, one’s attention is drawn to the previously selected options that dominate x.
Thus, the solution to the enlarged problem obtained by adding x as a feasible option
should be the intersection of the solution to the original problem with those options
that Pareto dominate x whenever that set is nonempty.
No Better Compromise(NBC). If both x and y belong to C (S), then there do not exist
z ∈ S and i ∈{ 1 2} such that x  i z  i y and y  −i z  −i x.
No Better Compromise captures the idea that the bargainers are trying to reach a
compromise. If two bargainers are not able to agree on a single option—so that both x
7Similar properties have been used repeatedly in the classical theories of bargaining and social choice
(see, for example, Karni and Schmeidler 1976).
8The symbol   refers to the Pareto relation (incomplete ordering on X × X) when comparing options,
i.e., x   y means x  1 y and x  2 y. Alternatively, the symbol   in C  refers to the pair ( 1  2) of linear
orderings on X. We do not introduce different symbols because the right meaning is always obvious from
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and y are identiﬁed as possible agreements—then it must be that there was no option z
available that could serve as a compromise between x and y. By this we mean that there
was no alternative z that falls “in between” x and y, in that it is better than x along the
dimension where it is worse than y and is better than y along the dimension where it is
worse than x.9
Removing an Alternative (RA). If C (S)  = {x},t h e nC (S \{x})∩C (S)  = ∅.
Removing an Alternative captures the sense in which the bargaining solutions asso-
ciated to the bargaining operator may be interpreted as a procedurally rational heuris-
tic. SincebothATTandNBCaretypicallyincompatiblewithWARP ,weproposeaweaker
consistency property. If an option (that is not the unique choice of the decision-maker)
is dropped, then at least one of the options that were chosen in the original problem
belongs to the solution of the reduced problem. Observe that RA is equivalent to IIA if
the bargaining solution is single-valued, as RA can be applied iteratively if one needs
to eliminate multiple irrelevant alternatives. Yet, moving to correspondences, the slight
difference between the two properties when eliminating a single alternative can lead
to major differences in terms of choices. In addition, RA also expresses some form of
continuity in our discrete setting. Indeed, making a small change in the set of avail-
able options (i.e., dropping only one alternative) should not modify too much the set of
selected elements (i.e., nonempty intersection) whenever this set is not a singleton.
Efficiency (EFF). If x ∈ C (S), then there does not exist y ∈ S such that y   x.
Efﬁciency captures the cooperative nature of the bargaining. It is also a standard
property in axiomatic bargaining and social choice.
Symmetry (SYM). If x y ∈ C (S) and there exists z ∈ S \{ x y} such that x/ ∈ C (S \{ z}),
then there exists z  ∈ S \{x y} such that y/ ∈ C (S \{z }).
Symmetry formalizes a sense in which all the options selected by the solution are of
equal “status.” Suppose x and y are both in the solution. Imagine that one of the bar-
gainersmakesthefollowingargumentagainsttheinclusionof x:“ x isnotselectedwhen
the option z is removed from the table; but since we did not choose z, we may consider
it off the table, hence, we should not select x.” Such an argument is not convincing if the
other bargainer can counter by observing that a similar claim can be made against y:i f
we remove z , which was not chosen, then y is no longer selected. Observe that SYM is
vacuousifthechoicemethodisrational,butitdoesplaceanontrivialrestrictiononirra-
tional procedures. However, this property is satisﬁed by some well known social welfare
functions such as the Borda rule mentioned above.
9Note that since we are using only ordinal information, any element z such that x  i z  i y and y  j
z  j x is interpreted as a “compromise,” regardless of how it is ranked relative to other elements that are
ranked in between x and y. One may question this interpretation if, for example, x  i z  i w  i v  i y and
y  i w  i v  i z  j x. In this case, it may seem less reasonable to consider z a compromise between x and
y, since in some sense, it is “closer” to x than to y. We return to this point in the concluding section, where
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Our main result in this section relies on the following inductive characterization of
the fallback bargaining solution (we relegate its proof to the Appendix).
Lemma 1. Let  ∈L(X)2 and let S be a bargaining problem with at least four elements.
(i) Then C
f
 (S) ={ x} if and only if
(a) x ∈ C
f
 (S \{w}) for each w ∈ S \{x}





 (S) ={ x y} if and only if
(a) C
f
 (S \{w}) ⊆{ x y} for each w ∈ S
(b) there exists w ∈ S \{ x y} such that C
f
 (S \{ w}) ={ x} if and only if there exists
w  ∈ S \{x y} such that C
f
 (S \{w }) ={ y}.
(iii) If C
f
 (S) ={ x}, C
f
 (S \{ y}) ={ x z},a n dC
f
 (S \{ z}) ={ x y}, then there exists
i ∈{ 1 2} such that y  i x  i z and z  −i x  −i y.
(iv) If C
f
 (S) = C
f
 (S \{ w}) ={ x y} for all w ∈ S \{ x y},t h e nx   w and y   w for all
w ∈ S \{x y}.
Theorem 1. The operator Cf is the only regular bargaining operator that satisﬁes EFF,
ATT, NBC, RA, and SYM.
Proof.W e ﬁ r s t c h e c k t h a t Cf satisﬁes the axioms. The EFF axiom and regularity fol-
low immediately from the deﬁnition. Axioms RA and SYM follow from Lemma 1 when
starting from a set that contains at least four options. As for sets with three options, no-
tice that x ∈ C
f
 ({x y z}) implies that x ∈ C
f
 ({x y}) ∩ C
f
 ({x z}) for each x, y, z,b yE F F ,
thereby showing RA. Also, x y ∈ C
f
 ({x y z}) implies that x   z and y   z, which guar-
antees SYM. As for ATT, observe that mini=1 2si(y S ∪{x}  ) = mini=1 2si(y S  )+1 for
each y ∈ C
f
 (S) such that y   x, while the minimal score of any other option cannot in-
crease by more than one point. Hence any such y must belong to C
f
 (S ∪{ x}) and any
option that was not selected for S does not belong to C
f
 (S ∪{ x}). Now we only have
to show that z/ ∈ C
f
 (S ∪{ x}) when C
f
 (S) ={ y z}, y   x and z   x. To ﬁx the notation,
suppose that argmini=1 2si(y S  ) = 1 and argmini=1 2si(z S  ) = 2.H e n c ez  1 y and






 (S) ={ x y} and that there exists z ∈ S such that x  i z  i y and y  −i z  −i x.H e n c ei t
must be that the minimal score for y is reached along dimension i and it is equal to the
minimal score of x that is reached along dimension −i. Alternatively, z scores at least
one more point than y (resp. x) along dimension i (resp. −i). This contradicts the fact
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We now move to the more difﬁcult part of the proof, showing the necessary condi-
tion. Thuslet C  bearegularbargainingoperatorthatsatisﬁestheﬁveaxioms. Weprove
that C  = C
f
  in two main steps.
Step 1. Let  ∈L(X)2 and let C  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes ATT, NBC,
RA, EFF, and SYM. If C (T) = C
f
 (T) for all T ⊆ X with two or three elements, then
C (S) = C
f
 (S) for all S ⊆ X.
We prove that C (S) = C
f
 (S) for all S ⊆ X by induction on the number of elements
in S. By assumption, the result is true when |S|=2 or 3. We assume now that the result
holds for any subset of X with at most s−1 elements, and we choose a set S with exactly
s elements (s ≥ 4). We have to prove that C (S) = C
f
 (S).
First note that C (S) has at most two elements. Suppose, on the contrary, that
x y z ∈ C (S). The EFF axiom implies that there is no Pareto comparison between any
pair of elements in {x y z}. Hence one of these three options must fall in between the
other two, leading to a contradiction with NBC.
Suppose now that C
f
 (S) ={ x y} for some x y ∈ S. Lemma 1 and the induction hy-
pothesis imply that C (S \{ w}) = C
f
 (S \{ w}) ⊆{ x y} for each w ∈ S. Notice that C (S)
cannot include an element different from x and y. Indeed, |C (S)|≤2 then implies that
C (S) is either {z}, {x z}, {y z},o r{z z } for some z z  ∈ S \{x y}, and RA leads to a con-
tradiction with C (S \{w}) ⊆{ x y} for all w ∈ S. So we are done after proving that C (S)
is equal to neither {x} nor {y}.S u p p o s e ,o nt h ec o n t r a r y ,t h a tC (S) ={ x} (a similar rea-
soning applies for y). The RA axiom implies that x ∈ C (S \{ w}) for all w ∈ S \{ x}.I f
there exists w ∈ S \{ y} such that y/ ∈ C (S \{ w}),t h e nC
f
 (S \{ w}) = C (S \{ w}) ={ x}.
Lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis imply that there exists w  ∈ S \{ x y} such that
C (S \{ w }) = C
f
 (S \{ w }) ={ y}, a contradiction with the fact that x ∈ C (S \{ w }).
We must conclude that C
f
 (S \{ w}) = C (S \{ w}) ={ x y} for all w ∈ S \{ x y}.B y p a r t
(iv) of Lemma 1, x   w and y   w for all w ∈ S \{ x y}. Therefore, C ({x w}) ={ x} and
C ({y w}) ={ y} since C  = C
f
  on pairs. We also have C ({x y}) = C
f
 ({x y}) ={ x y},
andbyapplyingATTiteratively(addingelementsof S\{x y} oneatatime), weconclude
that C (S) ={ x y}, contradicting the original assumption that C (S) ={ x}.
To conclude the proof of Step 1, suppose that C
f
 (S) ={ x},f o rs o m ex ∈ S.I f
C (S) ={ y} for some y  = x,t h e ny ∈ C (S \{ w}) for all w ∈ S \{ y},b yR A .T h i sl e a d s
to a contradiction with Lemma 1, since there must exist w ∈ S \{ y} such that y/ ∈
C
f
 (S\{w}) = C (S\{w}). It is also impossible to have C (S) ={ y z} for some y, z differ-
ent from x. Indeed, RA applied to both C  and C
f
  then implies that C
f
 (S \{ y}) ={ x z}
and C
f
 ({S\{z}) ={ x y}. Part (iii) of Lemma 1 implies that there exists i ∈{ 1 2} such that
y  i x  i z and z  −i x  −i y, a contradiction with NBC. Suppose now that C (S) ={ x y}
for some y different from x. Lemma 1 implies that there exists w ∈ S \{ y} such that
y/ ∈ C
f
 (S \{ w}) = C (S \{ w}). The SYM axiom implies that there exists w  ∈ S \{ x} such
that x/ ∈ C (S \{ w }) = C
f
 (S \{ w }), which is impossible. Hence C (S) ={ x}, as desired.
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Step2. LetC bearegularbargainingoperatorthatsatisﬁesATT,NBC,RA,andEFF.Then
C (T) = C
f
 (T) for all T ⊆ X with two or three elements and all  ∈L(X)2.
Let  ∈ L(X)2. Suppose ﬁrst T ={ x y}.I f x   y,t h e nC
f
 (T) ={ x}.B y E F F ,
y/ ∈ C ({x y}) and hence C (T) ={ x}, as desired. A similar reasoning applies if y   x.
If x  1 y and y  2 x,t h e nC
f
 (T) ={ x y}. Suppose, alternatively, that C (T) ={ x}.
Let g:X → X be the isomorphism deﬁned by g(x) = y, g(y) = x,a n dg(z) = z for all
z ∈ X \{x y}.T h eﬁ r s tr e g u l a r i t yp r o p e r t yi m p l i e st h a tCg( )(g(T)) ={ y}. Notice though
that g(T) = T,a n dg( ) = ( 2  1) when restricted to T. The second and third regular-
ity properties then imply that C (T) ={ y}, a contradiction. Similarly, C (T) ={ y} leads
to a contradiction, so we conclude that C (T) ={ x y}, as desired. A similar reasoning
applies if y  1 x and x  2 y.
Let now T ={ x y z}. If one of the elements, say x, Pareto dominates the other
two, then by EFF, C
f
 (T) ={ x}=C (T). If two elements, say x and y,a r en o tP a r e t o
dominated, but both Pareto dominate z,t h e nC
f
 (T) ={ x y}. The previous paragraph
implies that C ({x y}) ={ x y} and ATT implies that C (T) ={ x y}, as desired. If two
pairs of elements are not Pareto comparable, say (x y) and (x z), but the third one is,
say y   z,t h e nC
f
 (T) ={ y}. The previous paragraph implies that C ({x y}) ={ x y},
C ({x z}) ={ x z},a n dC ({y z}) ={ y}. The ATT axiom implies that C (T) ={ y} as well,
as desired. There remains the last case, where there is no Pareto comparison out of
any pair in T,l e tu ss a yx  1 y  1 z and z  2 y  2 x.T h e n C
f
 (T) ={ y}. We already
proved in Step 1 that C (T) contains at most two elements. It cannot be {x z},b e c a u s e
of NBC. If C (T) ={ x y}, thenconsidertheisomorphism g:X → X deﬁnedby g(x)= z,
g(z) = x,a n dg(ξ) = ξ for all ξ ∈ X \{ x z}. The ﬁrst regularity property implies that
Cg( )(g(T)) ={ y z}. Notice though that g(T) = T and g( ) = ( 2  1) when restricted
to T. The second and third regularity properties then imply that C (T) ={ y z},ac o n -
tradiction. A similar argument shows that it is impossible to have C (T) ={ y z}, {x},o r
{z}.H e n c eC (T) ={ y}. This concludes the proof of Step 2, and hence the proof of the
theorem.  
It can be shown that the axioms appearing in Theorem 1 are independent: dropping
any one of them expands the set of compatible solutions. For example, the analogue of
the Borda rule in our setting,
C (S) = argmax
x∈S
[s1(x S  )+s2(x S  )]
foreach S and  ,generatesaregularbargainingoperatorthatsatisﬁesallouraxiomsex-
ceptNBC.Moreover,theBordaruledoesnotexhibittheclassicalcompromiseeffectover
tripletsbecauseitselectsallthreeelementswhenevertheyarenotParetocomparable. It
does, however, exhibit the attraction effect. Another interesting example is the fallback
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Note that the fallback solution is applied here to a subset of options, whose score is
unaffected by dominated elements. It therefore violates ATT and, in addition, does not
exhibit the attraction effect. It does, however, exhibit the compromise effect. Our third
and ﬁnal example is the lexicographic reﬁnement of the fallback solution,
CL
f
 (S) ={ x ∈ C
f
 (S) | si(x S  ) ≥ si(y S  ) ∀i ∀y ∈ C
f
 (S)}
for each S and  , that generates a bargaining operator that satisﬁes all our axioms ex-
cept RA. Further details are available in a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website,
http://econtheory.org/supp/798/supplement.pdf.
Both Sprumont (1993)a n dKıbrıs and Sertel (2007) already provide some axiomatic
characterizations of the fallback solution in an interpersonal bargaining context. The
main axioms in these previous papers restrict the behavior of the solution across prob-
lems that differ in the bargainers’ preferences.10 As we show in the next section, our
axioms in the case of known preferences can be extended to the case of unknown pref-
erences by replacing statements about preferences with statements about choices from
pairs and triplets (where these choices have a natural interpretation of “revealed Pareto
dominance” and “revealed compromises”). This is possible because we follow the ap-
proach of individual choice theory and express all the axioms (apart from regularity,
which we drop in the next section) in terms of how the bargaining solution—for a ﬁxed
proﬁle of preferences—changes when elements are added to or removed from the bar-
gaining problem. In contrast, Sprumont (1993)a n dKıbrıs and Sertel (2007) take a social
choice approach and express their axioms in terms of how the bargaining solution—
over a ﬁxed set of options—changes when the preferences of the individual bargainers
change.
WeviewATTandNBCasdescriptivepropertiesofa“representativedecision-maker”
in the sense that they capture the observed behavior of the majority of subjects in the
relevantexperiments.11 Mostofthechoicetheoreticliteraturesofarhasfocusedinstead
onrelaxingtherationalitypostulatesoastocharacterizechoiceproceduresthatcapture
a wide variety of behavior. We, alternatively, focus on speciﬁc violations of rationality
and attempt to characterize the choice procedures that generate them. This is why we
impose these violations as properties.12 By not offering a general model of choice, our
model gains in predictive power and sheds more light on the regularities that may ex-
ist in the seemingly irrational behavior of the majority of subjects. In the next section,
10The only exception is the axiom of “minimal connectedness” in Kıbrıs and Sertel (2007), which has the
same implication as NBC.
11As we mentioned in the Introduction, the revealed-preference exercise in the next section can also
be interpreted as providing testable implications for interpersonal fallback bargaining. Under this inter-
pretation, the ATT and NBC properties have a normative appeal in the sense that they suggest how the
bargainers can resolve an impasse (i.e., a situation where they cannot agree on a unique solution to the
bargaining problem).
12By analogy, consider the well studied model of rank-dependent preferences with a concave decision-
weight function. Segal (1987) shows that a decision-maker with these preferences exhibits Allais-type be-
havior in a wide class of choice problems (what Segal refers to as the generalized Allais paradox or GAP for
short). This suggests that an alternative axiomatization of these preferences can start by imposing GAP as
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the preference orderings are no longer a primitive of the model. Our new model thus
accommodates rational choice behaviors, in which case the individual’s choices reveal
that there is no conﬂict between his two revealed-preference orderings.
5. Revealed preferences
The previous two sections suggest that the fallback bargaining procedure may poten-
tially explain systematic violations of WARP in multicriteria decision problems. One dif-
ﬁcultyintestingthishypothesisisthatinmanysituationswedonotdirectlyobservethe
criteria used by the decision-maker; neither do we observe how the options are ranked
according to each criterion. All we may hope to observe are the ﬁnal choices across
different decision problems. A natural question that arises is, What properties of these
choices are necessary and sufﬁcient to represent the decision-maker as if he has two
criteria in his mind for ranking the options, and he resolves the conﬂict between these
criteria by applying the fallback bargaining procedure? Suppose the observed choices
do satisfy the sufﬁcient conditions of the representation. Can we identify (at least par-
tially and, if so, to what extent) the two underlying linear orderings? We answer both
questions in this section.
Characterization
The approach we take is to try to adapt Theorem 1 to bargaining solutions that are not
preference-based. Note ﬁrst that the three regularity conditions of the previous section
are no longer useful, as they restrict the behavior of the solution across different pref-
erence proﬁles. However, the main properties of Theorem 1 can be suitably adapted to
the current environment.13
The RA and SYM axioms can be rephrased directly.
Removing an Alternative (RA). If C(S) = {x},t h e nC(S\{x})∩C(S) = ∅.
Symmetry (SYM). If x y ∈ C(S) and there exists z ∈ S \{ x y} such that x/ ∈ C(S \{ z}),
then there exists z  ∈ S \{x y} such that y/ ∈ C(S\{z }).
To adapt ATT and EFF, we introduce a notion of revealed Pareto comparison.
Definition 1. Option x is revealed Pareto superior to y if C({x y}) ={ x}.
That is, whatever dimensions or criteria the decision-maker uses to evaluatethe two
options, xisbetterthany accordingtoallofthem. Alternatively, C({x y}) ={ x y}means
that there is a negative correlation when comparing x and y across dimensions: x is
preferred to y along one, while y is preferred to x along the other. The EFF and ATT
axioms can now be rephrased using only observed choices.
13Fornotationalsimplicity, wekeepthesamenamesfor theaxioms asin theprevioussection. Of course,
although their motivation is similar, their formulation is not, since the models are different. We feel this
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Efficiency (EFF). If x ∈ C(S), then there does not exist y ∈ S such that y is revealed to be
Pareto superior to x.
Attraction (ATT). Let x ∈ X \ S be such that y is revealed to be Pareto superior to x for
some y ∈ C(S).T h e nC(S∪{x}) ={ y ∈ C(S)| C({x y}) ={ y}}.
To redeﬁne NBC, we introduce the notion of revealed compromise.
Definition2. An option z isrevealedtobeacompromisebetween x and y if itis chosen
uniquely from {x y z}, but no element in this triplet is revealed to be Pareto superior to
another.
No BetterCompromise(NBC). Ifboth xandy belongtoC(S),thentheredoesnotexist
z ∈ S such that z is revealed to be a compromise between x and y.
The above properties, however, do not guarantee the existence of two linear order-
ings such that the decision-maker’s choices can be explained by applying the fallback
solution. First, these properties (in particular, RA, which weakens WARP) do not imply
thattherevealedParetorelationistransitive. Thus, tohaveanyhopeofrecoveringapair
of preferences, the following condition must be met.
Pairwise Consistency (PC). If x is revealed to be Pareto superior to y and y is revealed
to be Pareto superior to z,t h e nx is revealed to be Pareto superior to z.
Second, none of the above properties implies the compromise effect. To see this,
suppose the decision-maker has a pair of orderings in his mind (which are not observ-
able to us) such that x  1 z  1 y, while y  2 z  2 x. Then a choice rule that picks {x y}
satisﬁes NBC without exhibiting the compromise effect. We must, therefore, take into
account a new testable implication: if there is no revealed Pareto comparison between
any two elements of {x y z}, then there must be a revealed compromise.
Existence of a Compromise (EC). If the choice out of any pair in {x y z} is the pair
itself, then C({x y z}) is a singleton.
The next two examples motivate our ﬁnal axiom. They demonstrate that none of
our axioms thus far guarantees that revealed compromises and their interaction with
revealed Pareto dominance are consistent with an underlying pair of preferences.
Example 1. Let X ={ a b c d},a n dl e tC be the bargaining solution that selects both
elements out of any pair and such that C({a b c}) ={ b}, C({a b d}) ={ d}, C({a c d}) =
{d}, C({b c d}) ={ d},a n dC({a b c d}) ={ d}. It is not difﬁcult to check that C sat-
isﬁes the seven axioms listed so far, but there is no pair ( 1  2) of linear orderings
such C = C
f
 . The inconsistency leading to this impossibility is easy to understand:
C({a b c}) ={ b} reveals that b is in between a and c, while C({a b d}) ={ d},a n d
C({b c d}) ={ d} reveals that d is in between both a and b,a n db and c. ♦142 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Example 2. Let X ={ a b c d} and let ( ∗
1  ∗
2) be the two linear orderings deﬁned
as d  ∗
1 a  ∗
1 b  ∗
1 c and d  ∗
2 c  ∗
2 b  ∗
2 a.L e t C be the bargaining solution such that
C({b d}) ={ b d} and C(S) = C
f
 ∗(S) for all S ⊆ X different from {b d}. It is not difﬁ-
cult to check that C satisﬁes the seven axioms listed so far, but there is no pair ( 1  2)
of linear orderings such C = C
f
 . The inconsistency here is rooted in the way revealed
Paretocomparisonscombinewithrevealedcompromises: bisrevealedtobeinbetween
a and c,a n dd is revealed to be Pareto superior to both a and c,y e tb is revealed to be
noncomparable to d. ♦
Toruleouttheinconsistenciesillustratedintheseexamples,weintroduceaproperty
that captures another sense in which compromises have a special status. Suppose y is
revealed to be a compromise between x and z. One way to interpret this is that after
a long process of deliberation, where one party argues in favor of x, while the other
argues in favor of z, the two parties agreed to settle on y. Thus, the choice of y may be
viewed as internalizing all the considerations in favor of each of the alternatives. This
suggests that if a new option, w, becomes available, the parties compare w only with y,
and do not ignore the previous arguments that led to the agreement on y by opening
up the discussion on all available options. Furthermore, if reaching a compromise has
special status to the bargainers, then they require a good enough reason to abandon it
completelyinfavorofanewoption. Inparticular,thepartiesmayreplaceacompromise
with a new option only when the latter Pareto dominates the former.
Overcoming a Compromise (OC). Suppose that y is revealed to be a compromise be-
tween x and z.I fC({w x y z}) ={ w},t h e nC({y w}) ={ w}.
The fallback bargaining solution satisﬁes an axiom of this type for all bargaining
problems, but we phrased it for bargaining problems with only four elements because
this is all that is needed to establish our result, as hinted by the two previous examples.
Our second main result establishes that the testable implications we have identi-
ﬁed are also sufﬁcient to guarantee the existence of two linear orderings such that the
decision maker’s choices may be explained by the fallback solution.
Theorem 2. A bargaining solution C satisﬁes EFF, ATT, NBC, RA, SYM, PC, EC, and OC
if and only if there exists  ∈L(X)2 such that C = C
f
 .
We start by providing a sketch of the proof to show that any bargaining solution sat-
isfying the axioms must be a fallback solution for some pair of strict preferences. The
formal proof follows. The argument unfolds in two main steps. First, we show that a
choice correspondence C satisfying EFF, ATT, NBC, RA, and SYM exhibits the following
property: if there exists a preference proﬁle   such that C coincides with C
f
  on all pairs
and triplets, then this remains true on all subsets of X. To prove this, we adapt the ar-
guments from the ﬁrst step of the proof of Theorem 1, which established a similar claim
for preference-based bargaining solutions.
In the second step—the more challenging part of the proof—we construct a pref-
erence proﬁle   such that C coincides with C
f
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here lies in the requirement that two preference relations deﬁned on one pair or triplet
must be consistent with relations deﬁned on different pairs and triplets. For exam-
ple, when we are given C({x y}) ={ x y}, we conclude that one bargainer prefers x to
y, while the other bargainer has the opposite ranking. Suppose we are also given that
C({y z}) ={ y z}. Then, again, we conclude that the two bargainers have opposite rank-
ings of y and z. The question is, How do we determine whether the bargainer who ranks
x over y also ranks y over z?
To answer this question, we use the choice data from triplets and construct the two
linear orderings inductively. We begin with one pair of elements and construct two pref-
erence relations over them. We then add a third element and extend the previous pair of
preferences to cover all three elements. We then continue adding one element at a time
and extending the relations from the previous step to cover the newly added element
u n t i lw eh a v ec o v e r e da l lo fX.
However, for this construction to succeed, the elements must be added in a particu-
larorder. First,wepartitionthesetofelementsinto“revealedParetolayers.” Thehighest
Pareto layer, denoted EFF1, consists of all the elements in X that are not revealed to be
Pareto inferior to any other element. Similarly, the second-highest Pareto layer, EFF2,i s
deﬁned as the set of elements in X \ EFF1 that are not revealed to be Pareto inferior to
any element not in EFF1. The next revealed Pareto layers are deﬁned in a similar man-
ner. Each Pareto layer EFFk is further partitioned into “inner” layers deﬁned as follows.
The most extreme layer, denoted Ek 1, contains the set of elements (at most two) that
are never revealedto be compromises within theParetolayer EFFk. The next inner layer
contains those elements that are never revealed to be compromises within EFFk \ Ek 1.
Continuing in this way we end with the most interior layer. Given these partitions, the
constructionofthetwopreferencerelationsproceedsasfollows: webeginwiththehigh-
est Pareto layer from which we choose the most extreme points and move inward. Once
we cover the entire Pareto layer, we move to the next Pareto layer and, again, begin with
the extreme points and move inward. A series of lemmas in the proof of Theorem 2 es-
tablishthattheabovemethodleadstotwopreferencerelationsthatarewelldeﬁnedand
transitive.
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We have already proved in the previous section that C
f
  satisﬁes
RA,SYM,EFF ,A TT ,andNBCforeach ∈L(X)2. WhereasPCandECarestraightforward
to check, only OC remains. The fallback solution generates the choice data on {x y z}
as in OC only if x  i y  i z and z  −i y  −i x for some i ∈{ 1 2}. Hence the minimal score
of y in the quadruplet is at least 1.F o rw to be chosen alone, it must be better than at
least two alternatives for each ordering, and hence w   y or C
f
 ({w y}) ={ w}, as desired.
Now let C beabargainingsolutionthatsatisﬁesSYM,RA,PC,EFF,ATT,NBC,EC,and
OC. It is not difﬁcult to adapt the argument from the ﬁrst step in the proof of Theorem 1
to show that C = C
f
  if  ∈L(X)2 is such that C(T)= C
f
 (T) for all T ⊆ X with two or
three elements. The difﬁcult part is to show that there indeed exists a pair ( 1  2) of
linear orderings such that C(T)= C
f
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proceed via an inductive argument. For each strictly positive integer k,l e tEFFk be the


















:C({x y}) ={ y}

(withtheconventionEFF0 = ∅). ThesubsetEFF1 isthesetofelementsthatareC-Pareto
efﬁcient in X. The subset EFF2 is the set of alternatives that are C-Pareto efﬁcient in
X \EFF1. These are “second-best” options in X. Notice that EFFk is nonempty for each
k such that X \[
	k−1
j=1 EFFj] is nonempty, since X is ﬁnite and C satisﬁes PC. Let K be
the smallest positive integer such that EFFK+1 = ∅.O p t i o nX is thus partitioned into a
collection (EFFk)K
k=1 of layers of options that are constrained to be efﬁcient at different
levels k.



















:C({x y z}) ={ x}

for each k ∈{ 1     K} and each strictly positive integer l (with the convention Ek 0 = ∅,
for each k). The EC axiom implies that a single element must be chosen out of any
triplet in EFFk. The variable Ek 1 denotes the set of elements that are never chosen out
ofanysuchtriplets. ThesecanbeinterpretedasextremeelementsofthelayerEFFk.T h e
variable Ek 2 denotes the set of elements that are extreme in the sublayer EFFk \ Ek 1,
and so on. The next lemma, whose proof is available in the Appendix, highlights the
structure of these sets.
Lemma 2. Let k ∈{ 1     K} and let l be a strictly positive integer. If EFFk \[
	l−1
j=0Ek j]
has at least two elements, then Ek l is nonempty and contains exactly two elements.
LetLk bethesmallestpositiveintegersuchthatEk Lk+1 = ∅. ThesubsetEFFk isthus
partitioned into a collection (Ek l)
Lk
l=1 of pairs of alternatives (and perhaps one singleton
if Ek Lk contains only one element). An element that belongs to a layer Ek l for some
large l can be interpreted as not too extreme, in that it is chosen as a compromise out of
more triplets in EFFk.
We are now ready to deﬁne   and to prove by induction that C(T)= C
f
 (T) for every
T ⊆ X with two or three elements. We start with a pair of elements in X, then add a
third element, and so on up to the point that all the elements of X have been consid-
ered. We have to be careful, though, to follow some special order for the argument to
work. Itfollowsfromourprevious deﬁnition thateach elementof X belongstoaunique
atom Ek l for some l ∈{ 1     Lk} and some k ∈{ 1     K}. This fact helps us determine
the right order in which elements must be added. Indeed, let (k(x) l(x)) be these two
positive integers associated to x. We follow the convention that x is added before x  if
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rule does not uniquely specify the ordering, as an atom Ek l usually contains two ele-
ments. We do not further specify how elements are added in the inductive argument, as
this is inconsequential for the construction of  , and the proof that C = C
f
  on pairs and
triplets.14
Let x and y be the ﬁrst two elements of X for which   must be deﬁned. If C({x y}) =
{x},t h e nw ei m p o s et h a tx  1 y and x  2 y. Similarly, if C({x y}) ={ y}, then we impose
that y  1 x and y  2 x. Finally, if C({x y}) ={ x y}, then we impose that x  1 y and y  2 x
or y  1 x and x  2 y. Either way works, and one may choose one of the two options
arbitrarily. Of course, C({x y}) = C
f
 ({x y}) by construction.
Suppose now that   has been deﬁned on a subset S of X and that C(T)= C
f
 (T) for
each T ⊆ S with two or three elements, while the next element to be added is w ∈ X \ S.
We now deﬁne the extension  ∗ over S ∪{ w}.O fc o u r s e , ∗ is deﬁned so as to coincide
with   on S, i.e., x  ∗
i y if and only if x  i y for each x y ∈ S and each i = 1 2.T h e
important question to answer is how elements of S compare with w under  ∗. For this,









x ∈ S | C({w x}) ={ w x}

 
NoticethatAw∩Bw = ∅andS = Aw∪Bw,becausethereisnox ∈ S suchthatC({w x}) =
{w} (given the way we add elements in our inductive argument). For each x ∈ Aw,w e
impose x  ∗
1 w and x  ∗
2 w. As for an element x ∈ Bw, we must distinguish two cases.
In the ﬁrst case, we assume that there exist z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) ={ w}.
Then we impose x  ∗
1 w and w  ∗
2 x when there exists y ∈ Bw such that x  1 y and
C({x w y}) ={ w}, and impose w  ∗
1 x and x  ∗
2 w when there exists y ∈ Bw such that
y  1 x and C({x w y}) ={ w}. We need to check that this is well deﬁned. This follows
from the next lemma, whose proof is available in the Appendix.
Lemma 3. If there exist z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) ={ w},t h e nf o re a c hx ∈ Bw,
there exists y ∈ Bw such that C({x w y}) ={ w}. In addition, if y y  ∈ Bw are such that
C({x w y}) = C({x w y }) ={ w},t h e nx  i y if and only if x  i y  for both i = 1 2.
Inthesecondcase,namelywhentheredonotexistz z  ∈ Bw suchthatC({z w z }) =
{w}, we impose x  ∗
1 w and w  ∗
2 x if there exist ξ ∈ Aw and y ∈ Bw such that y  1 ξ,a n d
impose w  ∗
1 x and x  ∗
2 w if there exist ξ ∈ Aw and y ∈ Bw such that y  2 ξ. If there is no
ξ ∈ Aw and no y ∈ Bw such that either y  ∗
1 ξ or y  ∗
2 ξ, then one is free to choose either
deﬁnition, i.e., x  ∗
1 w and w  ∗
2 x for all x ∈ Bw or w  ∗
1 x and x  ∗
2 w for all x ∈ Bw.15
Here, too, we need to check that this is well deﬁned. This follows from the next lemma,
whose proof is available in the Appendix.
14Identiﬁability,i.e.,thepossibilityofﬁndingmultiplepairsofordering suchthatC = C
f
 ,isthesubject
of the next theorem.
15Note that in this case, every element in Aw is revealed to be Pareto superior to any element outside
this set. As we show in the next subsection, this is the only case where we cannot uniquely identify the two
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Lemma 4. If there do not exist z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) ={ w}, then there do not
exist ξ ξ  ∈ Aw and y y  ∈ Bw such that y  2 ξ and y   1 ξ .
Now that the pair  ∗ of linear orderings is deﬁned on S ∪{w}, we check that they are
transitive, i.e., for i = 1 2, x  ∗
i w if x  i y and y  ∗
i w, x  i y if x  ∗
i w and w  ∗
i y,a n dt h e
reverse rankings of both of these cases. We postpone the argument to the Appendix.
We are done with our inductive argument and the proof of Step 2 after proving that
C(T)= C
f
 ∗(T) for all T ⊆ S ∪{ w} with two or three elements. When w/ ∈ T, this follows
directly from the inductive step. Consider some pair {x w},w h e r ex ∈ S.I fx ∈ Aw,t h e n
C({x w}) ={ x},a n d ∗ satisﬁes x  ∗
1 w and x  ∗
2 w.H e n c e ,C
f
 ∗({x w}) ={ x} as well, as
desired. If x ∈ Bw,t h e nC({x w}) ={ x w},a n d ∗ satisﬁes x  ∗
i w and w  ∗
−i x for some
i ∈{ 1 2}.H e n c e ,C
f
 ∗({x w}) ={ x w} as well, as desired.
Considernextatriplet {x y w}.I f{x y}⊆Aw,thenx  ∗ w andy  ∗ w. Theinductive
step and ATT imply C({x y w}) = C({x y}) = C
f
 ∗({x y}) = C
f
 ∗({x y w}), as desired.
Supposenextthatonlyoneofthealternativesin{x y},sayx,belongstoAw,inwhich
case y ∈ Bw. The PC axiom implies that C({x y}) ={ x} or {x y}. In the former case, x is
theonlyC-efﬁcient(resp. ∗-efﬁcient)optionin{x y w},andhenceC({x y w}) ={ x}=
C
f
 ∗({x y w}) by EFF, as desired. If C({x y}) ={ x y},t h e nC({x y w}) ={ x} by ATT. The
constructed preference proﬁle  ∗ satisﬁes x  ∗
i w  ∗
i y and y  ∗
−i x  ∗
−i w (here we use
the fact that  ∗
i is transitive, which is proven in the Appendix)f o rs o m ei ∈{ 1 2}.H e n c e
C
f
 ∗({x y w}) ={ x} as well, as desired.
Finally,weconsiderthecaseinwhichneitherxnory belongstoAw.T h i sm e a n st h a t
x y ∈ Bw. Suppose that C({x y}) is a singleton, say {x}.T h e nC({x y w}) ={ x} by ATT.
The constructed preference proﬁle  ∗ satisﬁes x  ∗
i y  ∗
i w and w  ∗
−i x  ∗
−i y (again,
remember that  ∗
i and  ∗
−i are transitive) for some i ∈{ 1 2}.H e n c eC
f
 ∗({x y w}) ={ x}
as well, as desired.
Now comes the last, and most difﬁcult, case where C({x y}) ={ x y} and x y ∈ Bw.
By construction, x  i y and y  −i x for some i ∈{ 1 2}. Since the choice out of any pair in
{x y w} is the pair itself, EC implies that C({x y w}) is a singleton. Assume without loss
of generality that x has been added before y in the induction.
If C({x y w}) ={ w}, then by construction, x  ∗
i w  ∗
i y and y  ∗




 ∗({x y w}) ={ w} as well, as desired.
Assume C({x y w}) ={ x}.O b s e r v e t h a tk(x) ≤ k(y) ≤ k(w), since y is added after
x,a n dw is added after y. In addition, x, y,a n dw cannot all lie in the same C-Pareto
layer, i.e., k(x) < k(w). To see why, suppose, to the contrary, that {x y w}⊆EFFk(x).
Then l(x) ≤ l(y) ≤ l(w), since y is added after x and w is added after y.H e n c e ,b yt h e
deﬁnition of Ek(x) l(x), C({x y w})  = {x}, a contradiction. Since k(w) > k(x),t h e r em u s t
exist w  ∈ S such that k(w ) = k(x) and C({w w }) ={ w }. Lemma 9 from the Appendix
implies that C({x y w }) ={ x}.H e n c eC
f
 ({x y w }) ={ x} by the induction hypothesis,
and we must have w   i x  i y and y  −i x  −i w . Since C({w w }) ={ w }, we know that
w   ∗ w. By transitivity, we get x  ∗
−i w. Since C({x w}) ={ x w},w eh a v ew  ∗
i x.H e n c e
C
f
 ∗({x y w}) ={ x}, as desired.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Reason-based choice 147
Assume ﬁnally that C({x y w}) ={ y}.I fk(x) = k(y) = k(w),t h e nl(x)≤ l(y) ≤ l(w),
since y is added after x and w is added after y.T o h a v e C({x y w}) ={ y},i tm u s tb e
that l(y) > l(x), by deﬁnition of Ek(x) l(x). Lemma 2 implies that there exists another
element x  in Ek(x) l(x). Since l(y) > l(x),i tm u s tb et h a tC({x y x }) ={ y}.T o s a t -
isfy the induction hypothesis and the convention x  i y,w em u s th a v ey  i x . Since
l(w) > l(x),i tm u s tb et h a tC({x w x }) ={ w}. The second statement from Lemma 7
in the Appendix implies that C({w y x })  = {y}, since C({x y w}) ={ y}. Alternatively,
C({w x  y})mustbeasingletonbyECandcannotbe{x }either,sincel(x )<l( y)≤ l(w).
Hence C({w x  y}) ={ w} and y  ∗
i w by deﬁnition. We conclude that x  i y  ∗
i w and
w  ∗
−i y  −i x, which implies C
f
 ∗({w x y}) ={ y}, as desired.
To conclude, suppose that k(x) < k(w). Since C({x w}) ={ x w} and C({y w}) =
{y w}, there are three cases to consider.
Case 1.W eh a v ex  i y  ∗
i w and w  ∗
−i y  −i x.
Case 2.W eh a v ex  ∗
i w  ∗
i y and y  ∗
−i w  ∗
−i x.
Case 3.W eh a v ew  ∗
i x  i y and y  −i x  ∗
−i w.
If Case 1 prevails, then C
f
 ∗({x y w}) ={ y}. So we are done after proving that Cases
2a n d3a r ei m p o s s i b l e .
In Case 2 there are elements on both sides of w according to  ∗,h e n c e ,w em a y
apply Lemma 3.T h u s , t h e r e e x i s t s x  ∈ Bw such that C({x w x }) ={ w}. I tm u s tb e
that C({x  y}) ={ x  y}, as otherwise we get a contradiction with C({w x y}) ={ y} via
Lemma 9. Since x  ∗
i w,i tm u s tb et h a tx  i x . Transitivity of  ∗ also implies that x  i y.
So there are two subcases to consider:
Subcase2a.W eh a v ex  i y  i x  andviceversafor −i (becausethechoiceoutofboth
{x y} and {x  y} is the pair itself).
Subcase 2b.W eh a v ex  i x   i y and vice versa for −i.
Knowing that C({x w x }) ={ w} and C({w x y}) ={ y}, Subcase 2b (leading to
C({x x  y}) ={ x } by the induction hypothesis) is incompatible with RA, given that
C({w x x  y}) contains at most two elements (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix). The RA
axiom can be satisﬁed in Subcase 2a only if C({w x x  y}) ={ y} or {w y}.T h ef o r m e r
leads to a contradiction with OC. In the second case, notice that a single option must be
selected out of {w x  y} by EC, and it must be w by RA and SYM. Recall that y  i x  in
Subcase 2a, and hence, y  ∗
i w by deﬁnition of  ∗, in contradiction to Case 2.
As for Case 3, let w  ∈ EFFk(x) be such that C({w w }) ={ w }.H e n c e w   ∗
i w by
deﬁnition and transitivity implies that w   i x  i y.T h e n C({w  x}) ={ w  x} implies
y  −i x  −i w . On the one hand, we can conclude that C({w  y}) ={ w  y}, and hence
C({x y w }) ={ y} by Lemma 9,o rC
f
 ({x y w }) ={ y}, by the induction hypothesis. On
the other hand, if we can compute C
f
 ({x y w }) directly from  ,t h e nw eg e t{x},h e n c e
the contradiction.  
The axioms appearing in Theorem 2 are independent. Details are available in a
supplementary ﬁle on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/supp/798/
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Identiﬁability
There is no hope to identify the underlying preference relations uniquely on both di-
mensions. Indeed, thereisnoway totellwhich orderingisassociatedtoaspeciﬁcselfor
dimension of choice: if C = C
f
  for some pair ( 1  2) of linear orderings on X,t h e nw e
also have C = C
f
( 2  1) (cf. the second regularity condition in the previous section). One
may wonder whether this is the only source of multiplicity. The answer is not quite, but
almost, as the following example and theorem illustrate.
Example 3. Consider X ={ a b c d} and C = C
f
 ,w h e r ea  1 b  1 c  1 d and b  2
a  2 d  2 c. It is not difﬁcult to check that also C = C
f
  ,w h e r eb   
1 a   
1 c   
1 d and
a   
2 b   
2 d   
2 c. The careful reader notices that    is obtained from   by exchanging
the preferences of the two selves only as far as a and b are concerned. This change is
irrelevant as far as the fallback bargaining solution is concerned, because both a and b
Pareto dominate both c and d according to  , implying that c and d are irrelevant when
it comes to determining the solution of any subset S of X that includes either a, b,o r
both. ♦
As u b s e tS of X is C-dominant if it is nonempty and C({x y}) ={ x} for all x ∈ S and
ally ∈ X\S.16 ObservethatifS andS  arebothC-dominant,thenS ⊆ S  orS  ⊆ S.A l s oX
is trivially C-dominant. So there exists a unique minimal C-dominant set S∗
1 in X.S i m -
ilarly, a subset S of X \ S∗
1 is C-dominant in X \ S∗
1 if it is nonempty and C({x y}) ={ x}
for all x ∈ S and all y ∈ X \(S∪S∗
1).L e tS∗
2 be the minimal C-dominant set in X \S∗
1.I t e r -
ating the procedure, one obtains a partition of X into a ﬁnite sequence   = (S∗
1     S∗
K)
of sets with the property that S∗




Theorem 3. Let   and    be two pairs of strict linear orderings. Then C
f
  = C
f
   if and
only if    can be obtained from   by permuting the two orderings over atoms of   that
contains at least two elements.
Proof. The sufﬁcient condition is easy to check, so we focus attention only on the nec-
essary condition. Let C be the common bargaining solution. Since it coincides with the
fallback bargaining solution for some pair of orderings, it satisﬁes the axioms listed in
the previous section, and the induction we followed in the proof of Theorem 2 can be
reproduced here as well.
Let S∗ be an atom of the partition  .W ep r o v et h a t  and   , restricted to S∗,m u s t
coincide or be a permutation of each other. The result follows, since there is only one
way to patch together the orderings obtained on the different atoms of  ,s oa st ob e
consistent with C: x   y if and only if x belongs to an atom that comes before the atom
to which y belongs. For the sake of notational simplicity, we assume that S∗ is the ﬁrst
atomof   withatleasttwoelements,butthereasoningcaneasilybeextendedbyinduc-
tion to any subsequent atom (the argument is trivial if S∗ is the ﬁrst atom and it has only
16If C satisﬁes EFF, then S is C-dominant if and only if C(T)⊆ S for each T ⊆ X such that S ∩T  = ∅.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Reason-based choice 149
one element). Let x and y be the ﬁrst two elements to be considered in the induction of
Theorem 2. Notice that C({x y}) ={ x y}, as otherwise either {x} or {y} is C-dominant,
a contradiction with the fact that S∗ is minimal. Let i and j be such that x  i y, y  −i x,
x   
j y,a n dy   
−j x. Let us now think about how   and    extend to larger sets by adding
elements in an order that follows the induction from the proof of Theorem 2.L e tw be
the third element in the induction. Looking back at the proof, notice that there is only
one possible such extension so that the associated fallback solution coincides with C.
For instance, if x ∈ Aw, then imposing anything other than x   w and x    w leads to
a contradiction with C({w x}) ={ x}.I f x ∈ Bw and C({x w y}) ={ w}, then imposing
anything other than x  i w  i y, y  −i w  −i x, x   
j w   
j y,a n dy   
−j w   
−j x contra-
dicts C. Finally, suppose C({w x y})  = {w} and x ∈ Bw.I f y ∈ Bw, then since w is the
third element to be added, l(y)<l(w) (recall the notation from our induction argument
in Theorem 2), which means that C({w x y})  = {w}, a contradiction. Therefore, y ∈ Aw,
and one must choose y   w and y    w, which, together with transitivity, forces us to
choose x  i w, w  −i x, x   
j w,a n dw   
−j x. More generally, it is easy to check that the
inductive argument from Theorem 2 implies that the deﬁnition of   on {x y} uniquely
determines its deﬁnition on larger sets obtained by adding elements w,e x c e p ti fBw is
nonempty, there are no z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) ={ w}, and no (ξ y) ∈ Aw × Bw
such that either y  1 ξ or y  2 ξ. The same is true for   . The rest of the proof amounts
to showing that these conditions occur only if Aw is C-dominant. Since this contradicts
the minimality of S∗,i ti m p l i e st h a t =   on S∗ (if i = j) or they are a permutation of
each other (if i =− j), as desired.
Suppose thus that Bw is nonempty, there are no z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) =
{w}, and no (ξ y) ∈ Aw × Bw such that either y  1 ξ or y  2 ξ. The same is true for   .
Let a ∈ Aw and b ∈ X \ Aw. W eh a v et op r o v et h a tC({a b}) ={ a}.I f b is added be-
fore w in the induction, then b ∈ Bw and the result follows trivially from the conclusion
that no element in Bw is ever chosen in a pair containing an element in Aw. Suppose
now that b is added after w in the induction, i.e., (k(b) l(b)) lexicographically domi-
nates (k(w) l(w)). Suppose ﬁrst that k(b) = k(w). Since there is no z z  ∈ Bw such that
C({z w z }) ={ z},i tm u s tb et h a tl(w) = 1. Since Bw is nonempty, it must be that there
exists another element w  such that k(w ) = k(w) that has been added before w:t h i s
must be the other element of the atom E(k(w) 1) (remember that those atoms contain at
most two elements, see Lemma 2). Hence C({w b w }) ={ b}. Since there is no element
in Aw and no element in Bw from which C picks both elements, then C({a w }) ={ a}.
Since C = C ,w em u s th a v ea   w and a   w ,a n dt h e r ee x i s t si ∈{ 1 2} such that
w  i b  i w  and w   i b  i w.H e n c eC({a b}) ={ a}, as desired. Finally, if k(b) > k(w),
then there exists x   such that k(x  ) = k(w) and C({x   b}) ={ x  } (x   could be w itself).
By essentially the same argument as above, we may conclude that C({a x  }) ={ a},a n d
hence, C({a b}) ={ a} by PC, as desired.  
6. Concluding remarks
This paper proposes to formalize the notion of “reason-based choice” as a coopera-
tive solution to bargaining between the conﬂicting inner selves of a decision-maker.150 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
The speciﬁc bargaining solution we characterize—the fallback bargaining solution—
has several noteworthy features. First, it can be implemented with a straightforward
algorithm, which is reminiscent of usual methods weighing pros and cons. Second, it
admits a simple non-cooperative foundation, and hence may be interpreted as the out-
come of inter-personal as well as intrapersonal bargaining. Third, it has been studied
before in the social choice literature. Finally, it generates two well known violations
of rationality—the attraction and the compromise effects—while retaining substantial
testable implications. Moreover, when a choice problem involves both attraction and
compromises, fallback bargaining makes a prediction as to what outcome is chosen. In
particular, when there is a single option x, which is ranked in between all others, and
only one pair of elements (y z) (such that y z  = x) that are Pareto comparable, then
fallback bargaining selects x alone. In this sense, fallback bargaining may be viewed as
“favoring” the compromise effect over the attraction effect.
In what follows, we discuss two interesting extensions of the fallback bargaining
solution.
More than two bargainers
It is straightforward to adapt the deﬁnition of the fallback solution to any number of
selves. Given n strict preference orderings on X,  =( 1      n), deﬁne the fallback
bargaining solution associated with   as
C
f
 (S) = argmax
x∈S
min
i=1     n
si(x   S)
for each S ⊆ X,w h e r e
si(x S  ) =| { y ∈ S | x  i y}| 
Movingfromonetotwoselvesallowsustoexplainirrationalchoicepatterns,accom-
modating both the attraction and the compromise effects, while retaining some signif-
icant predictive power. Restricting attention to the dual-self case is the natural place
to start (see, e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer 2001, Fudenberg and Levine 2006,a n dManzini
and Mariotti 2007) ,b u ti ti sa l s oi m p o r t a n tt og e tas e n s eo fh o wm u c hm o r ep e r m i s s i v e
the model becomes if one leaves the number of selves unrestricted. Contrary to numer-
ous other models (see, e.g., Kalai et al. 2002 and, especially, Ambrus and Rozen 2009),
fallback bargaining does retain some predictive power independently of the number of
selves involved.
Proposition 1. Let C be a bargaining solution for which there exist n strict preference
orderings deﬁned on X,  =( 1      n),s u c ht h a tC = C
f
 .T h e n C satisﬁes RA, EFF,
NBC, and PC. It also satisﬁes the following three properties.
(i) One inclusion from ATT. If x/ ∈ S,t h e n{y ∈ C(S)| C({x y}) ={ y}} ⊆ C(S∪{x}).
(ii) Strengthening of RA. If x ∈ C(S) and C(S) = {x},t h e nC(S \{ x}) = C(S)\{ x}.I f
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(iii) Weaker version of OC. Suppose that C selects the pair out of every pair in {a b c}.
If C({a b c}) ={ b} and C({a b c d}) ={ d},t h e nC(S)={ d} for any triplet S that
contains d and two other elements from {a b c}.
The proof is available in a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website, http://
econtheory.org/supp/798/supplement.pdf. More work is needed to check whether the
axioms in Proposition 1 are also sufﬁcient to guarantee the existence of n strict prefer-
ence orderings such that C = C
f
 . We note that the properties ATT, EC, SYM, and OC are
no longer systematically true when allowing for any number of selves.
When alternatives have more than two dimensions, one may further question our
assumption that all dimensions are treated equally. A natural extension is to allow the
individual to put different weights on different dimensions and to make a choice ac-
cording to, say, a “weighted” fallback solution. When the weights of the dimensions and
the ranking within each dimension are not observable, the revealed exercise is to try to
infer both from observed choices. One potential concern with this is identiﬁability: the
additionalfreedomto choosetheweights on thedimensions may allow thesame choice
correspondence to be consistent with a wide variety of preferences.
Intensities
One has the intuition that the prevalence of the attraction and compromise effects in
applications may depend on factors that cannot be captured in our ordinal model.
More speciﬁcally, choices may be inﬂuenced by some trade-offs that involve a no-
tion of “distance” or “intensity.” An individual may exhibit a compromise effect when
x = (100 1), y = (50 50),a n dz = (1 100), but (perhaps) not when y = (2 2). Similarly,
he may be more likely to exhibit the attraction effect when x = (60 40), y = (59 39),a n d
z = (40 60), but (perhaps) not when y = (41 39).
To better understand how fallback bargaining can be modiﬁed to accommodate
these alternative choice patterns, notice ﬁrst how robust the patterns studied in this pa-
per can be. Indeed, they prevail for any preference-based aggregation method (without
any restriction on the number of selves) that picks x whenever there exists a unique op-
tion x that is not bottom ranked by any self. Even if one introduces “intensities” to com-
pute scores, e.g., the sum of the distances with respect to options in the lower contour
set along each relevant dimension, one still retains the exact same patterns of choices
when maximizing the minimum of the modiﬁed scores. An interesting variant to the
maximization of the minimum is the maximization of the weighted sum of the minimal
and the maximal scores, i.e.,
W α(x S  ) = αmin{s1(x S  ) s2(x S  )}+(1−α)max{s1(x S  ) s2(x S  )} 
where α is a parameter between 1
2 and 1. With ordinal scores, as studied in the present
paper, maximizing W α coincides with the Borda rule when α = 1
2 and coincides with the
fallback solution when α = 1.
Introducting intensities to the way scores are computed allows us to capture more
subtle attraction and compromise effects. As suggested above, if each alternative x is
a vector of two real numbers, (x1 x2),t h es c o r es1(x S  ) can be deﬁned as the sum152 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
of differences, (x1 − y1),o v e ra l ly in S with y1 ≤ x1. Thus, under this scoring method,
if x = (100 1) and z = (1 100),a ne l e m e n t(y y) is chosen as a compromise only if y>
(200 − 199α)/(2 − α). An even richer way to deﬁne scores is to make them a function
of the distribution of elements in the lower contour sets. These extensions are left for
future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Necessity. Suppose that C
f




si(x S \{w}  ) ≥ min
i=1 2
si(x S  )−1 ≥ min
i=1 2
si(y S  ) ≥ min
i=1 2
si(y S \{w}  ) 
and hence x ∈ C
f
 (S \{w}), as desired.
Now let y ∈ S \{ x}. Suppose that j ∈ argmini=1 2si(y S  ).I ft h e r ee x i s t sw ∈ S such
that y  j w,t h e nw eh a v e
min
i=1 2
si(x S \{w}  ) ≥ min
i=1 2
si(x S  )−1 > min
i=1 2
si(y S  )−1 = min
i=1 2
si(y S \{w}  ) 
and hence y/ ∈ C
f
 (S \{ w}). If there does not exist w ∈ S such that y  j w,t h e n
mini=1 2si(y S \{ w}  ) = 0 and y/ ∈ C
f
 (S \{ w}) for each w ∈ S \{ y}, since |S \{ w}| ≥ 3,
and the minimal score attained at the chosen element(s) is always greater than or equal
to the ﬁrst integer below half the number of elements in the choice set.
Sufﬁciency. Assuming that conditions (i)(a) and (b) are true, we need to prove that
C
f
 (S) ={ x}.I fC
f
 (S) ={ y} for some y ∈ S\{x}, then the necessary condition for subcase
(i) implies that y ∈ C
f
 (S \{ w}) for all w ∈ S \{ y}, thereby contradicting (i)(b). If C
f
 (S) =
{y z} for some y z ∈ S \{ x}, then condition (ii)(a) implies that C
f
 (S \{ w}) ⊆{ y z} for
all w ∈ S, thereby contradicting (i)(a). Finally, suppose that C
f
 (S) ={ x y} for some
y ∈ S \{x}. Condition (i)(b) implies that there exists w ∈ S \{y} such that y/ ∈ C
f
 (S \{w}).
Condition (ii)(b) implies thatthereexists w  ∈ S\{x} suchthat C
f
 (S\{w }) ={ y},t h e r e b y
contradicting (i)(a). We must conclude that C
f
 (S) ={ x}, as desired.
(ii) Necessity of (ii)(a). Suppose that C
f
 (S) ={ x y}.T h e n
min
i=1 2
si(x S  ) = min
i=1 2
si(y S  ) 
Assume that argmini=1 2si(x S  ) = 1 and argmini=1 2si(y S  ) = 2 (a similar reason-
ing applies if 1 and 2 are exchanged). Let k = s1(x S  ) = s2(y S  ). First note that the
minimal score of x (resp. y) does not change in S \{ x} (resp. S \{ y}), while the minimal
score of any other element w ∈ S \{x y} does not increase. Since mini=1 2si(w S  )<k,
we have that C
f
 (S \{x}) ={ y} (resp. C
f
 (S \{y}) ={ x}).
Second,considersomew ∈ S\{x y}. Observethatitisimpossibletohavew  1 xand
w  2 y, since the minimal score of w in S is then larger than the minimal score of both xTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Reason-based choice 153
and y.I fw  1 x (resp. if w  2 y), then the minimal score of x (resp. y)i st h es a m ei nb o t h
S andS\{w},andthereforeremainsstrictlylargerthantheminimalscoreofanyelement
in S \{ w x y} (since it does not increase by deleting w). Hence C
f
 (S \{ w}) ⊆{ x y},a s
desired. If x  1 w and y  2 w (implying that x   w and y   w), then the minimal scores
of x and y are the same in S \{ w} and are equal to k − 1.L e t z ∈ S \{ x y w}. Since
C
f
 (S) ={ x y} and since the minimal score of any element does not increase when a set
shrinks, then mini=1 2si(z S \{ w}  ) ≤ k − 1.I f mini=1 2si(z S \{ w}  ) = k − 1,t h e n
mini=1 2si(z S  ) = k − 1 and w is ranked above z according to argmini=1 2si(z S  ).
But since x   w and y   w, and the minimal scores of x and y in S equal k, it follows
that the minimal score of z in S must be at most k − 2, a contradiction. It follows that
mini=1 2si(z S \{w}  )<k−1 for all z ∈ S \{x y w}, and hence, C
f
 (S \{w}) ={ x y}.
Necessityof(ii)(b). Supposenowthat C
f
 (S\{w}) ={ x}. Fromthepreviousparagraph
it follows that this is true if and only if w  1 x and y  2 w. Hence there exists w  ∈ S such
that x  1 w  and w   2 y, as otherwise the minimal score of y is strictly greater than the
minimal score of x,a n dC
f
 (S \{w }) ={ y}, as desired.
Sufﬁciency. Assuming that conditions (ii)(a) and (b) are true, we need to prove that
C
f
 (S) ={ x y}.I fz ∈ C
f
 (S) for some z ∈ S \{ x y}, then the necessary condition for sub-
cases (i) and (ii) implies that z ∈ C
f
 (S\{w}) for some w ∈ S, thereby contradicting (ii)(a).
If C
f
 (S) ={ x}, then (i)(b) and (ii)(a) imply that C
f
 (S \{ w}) ={ x} for some w ∈ S \{ x}.
Alternatively, (i)(a) implies that x ∈ C
f
 (S \{ w }) for all w  ∈ S \{ x}, and this leads to a
contradiction with condition (ii)(b). A similar reasoning shows that C
f
 (S)  = {y},a n d
hence C
f
 (S) ={ x y}, as desired.
(iii) Suppose C
f
 (S) ={ x}, C
f
 (S \{ y}) ={ x z},a n dC
f
 (S \{ z}) ={ x y}.I fy   z,t h e n
y looses one point along both dimensions when dropping z, and the minimal score of x
remains strictly greater than that of y in S \{z}, hence a contradiction with C
f
 (S \{z}) =
{x y}. Similarly, it cannot be that z   y. There is no Pareto relation between x and z or x
and y either, since C
f
 (S \{ y}) ={ x z} and C
f
 (S \{ z}) ={ x y}.L e ti ∈{ 1 2} be such that
y  i z. Three cases remain possible: x  i y  i z and z  −i y  −i x; y  i x  i z and z  −i
x  −i y;o ry  i z  i x and x  −i z  −i y. Consider the ﬁrst case. Since y is above x along
−i and C
f
 (S \{ z}) ={ x y}, it must be that the minimal score of y in S \{ z} is attained
along the i dimension and is equal to the minimal score of x in S \{z}, which is attained
along the −i dimension. Adding z, the minimal score of y increases by one point, while
that of x remains unchanged, hence a contradiction with C
f
 (S) ={ x}.T h e t h i r d c a s e
leads to a similar contradiction. Hence only the second case remains, as desired.
(iv) Part (iv) follows from the proof of (ii).
Proving Lemma 2
Lemma5. Let C beabargainingsolutionthatsatisﬁesEFF,NBC,andEC.Then |C(S)|≤2
for all S ⊆ X.
Proof. Suppose that one can ﬁnd three elements x, y,a n dz in C(S) for some S ⊆ X.
The EFF axiom implies that the choice out of any pair in {x y z} is the pair itself, and EC
implies that a single element must be chosen out of the triplet. This contradicts NBC.  154 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Lemma 6. Let C be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes SYM, RA, PC, EFF, ATT, NBC, and
EC. Let w, x, y,a n dz be four distinct elements of X.I f C({w x y z}) ={ x y},t h e n
C({w x z}) ={ x}.
Proof. The RA axiom implies that x ∈ C({w x z}). Lemma 5 implies that we are done
after proving that C({w x z}) is not equal to {w x} or {x z}. Since the argument is sim-
ilar in both cases, we only show how to rule out the ﬁrst. Suppose, to the contrary that
C({w x z}) ={ w x}. The EFF axiom implies that C({w x}) ={ w x}, C({w z})  = {z},a n d
C({x z})  = {z}. The EC axiom implies that it is impossible to have C({w z}) ={ w z} and
C({x z}) ={ x z}. The ATT axiom also implies that it is impossible to have C({w z}) =
{w} and C({x z}) ={ x z} or C({w z}) ={ w z} and C({x z}) ={ x}.H e n c eC({x z}) ={ x}
and C({w z}) ={ w}.A l s o ,C({w x y z}) ={ x y} implies, by EFF, that C({x y}) ={ x y},
C({y z})  = {z},a n dC({w y})  = {w}.
Notice that C({w x y}) must be a singleton—because of EC if C({w y}) ={ w y} and
because of ATT if C({w y}) ={ y}. Suppose C({w x y}) ={ y}.I f C({y z}) ={ y},t h e n
C({x y z}) ={ x y} by ATT, and we get a contradiction with SYM. If C({y z}) ={ y z},
then it must be that C({w y}) ={ w y} to avoid a contradiction with PC. The ATT axiom
thus implies that C({w y z}) ={ w}, which contradicts RA. Suppose C({w x y}) ={ x}.
Then by SYM, C({x y z}) ={ y}. But this contradicts ATT because C({x y}) ={ x y} and
C({x z}) ={ x}. Hence, the original hypothesis that C({w x z}) ={ w x} is false, and we
are done with the proof.  
Lemma 7. Let C be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes SYM, RA, PC, EFF, ATT, NBC, EC,
and OC, and let w, x, y,a n dz be four distinct elements of X such that the choice out of
any pair is the pair itself. Then the three following statements are true.
(i) If C({w x y}) ={ x} and C({x y z}) ={ y},t h e nC({w x z}) ={ x}.
(ii) It is impossible to have C({x y z}) ={ y}, C({x w y}) ={ w},a n dC({y w z}) =
{w}.
(iii) If C({w x z}) ={ x} and C({x y z}) ={ y},t h e nC({w x y}) ={ x}.
Proof. For the ﬁrst statement, assume that C({w x y}) ={ x} and C({x y z}) ={ y}.
The RA axiom implies that C({w x y z}) cannot be w or y, since w y ∈{ w x y} and
C({w x y}) ={ x}, and cannot be {x} or {z}, since x z ∈{ x y z} and C({x y z}) ={ y}.
Lemma 5 implies that C({w x y z}) must contain two elements. The RA axiom rules
out {w y}, {x z}, {w x}, {y z},a n d{w z}.H e n c ei tm u s tb e{x y}. Applying Lemma 6,w e
conclude that C({w x z}) ={ x}, as desired.
For the second statement, assume that C({x y z}) ={ y}, C({x w y}) ={ w},a n d
C({y w z}) ={ w}. It is not difﬁcult to check that RA and Lemma 5 imply that
C({w x y z}) must equal {w} or {w y}. The former case leads to a contradiction with
OC, while the other leads to a contradiction with SYM.
For the third statement, assume that C({w x z}) ={ x} and C({x y z}) ={ y}.T h e
EC axiom implies that C({w x y}) must be a singleton. Suppose that C({w x y}) ={ w}.
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that C({w y z}) ={ w}. Hence a contradiction with the second statement (w is in be-
tween both x and y,a n dy and z, while y is in between x and z). If C({w x y}) ={ y},
then one gets again a contradiction with the second statement (y is in between both w
and x,a n dx and z, while x is in between w and z).  
ProofofLemma2. WewanttoprovethatforeachsetY ⊆ X withatleasttwoelements
and such that the choice out of any pair in Y is the pair itself, there exist exactly two
elements in Y that are not chosen out of any triplet in Y. This is done by induction on
the number of elements in Y. The result is trivial if |Y|=2 or 3.L e t α be a positive
integer greater than or equal to 3, and suppose that the result holds for all sets with no
more than α elements. Consider now a set Y with α+1 elements.
First notice that there cannot be more than two elements in Y that are not chosen
out of any triplet, since the choice out of any triplet in Y is a singleton by EC. Since Y
has more than three elements, we can choose y x x  ∈ Y such that C({x y x }) ={ y}.
Let ξ and ξ  be the two elements in Y \{ y} that are not chosen out of any triplet in
Y \{ y} (using the induction hypothesis). We are done with the proof after showing that
these two elements are not chosen out of any triplet in Y. This amounts to showing
that C({ξ y z})  = {ξ} for all z ∈ Y \{ ξ y} and that C({ξ  y z})  = {ξ } for all z ∈ Y \{ ξ  y}
(since we already know that ξ and ξ  are not chosen out of any triplet in Y \{ y}). We
prove the ﬁrst statement only; the argument with ξ  instead of ξ is similar. We proceed
by considering three cases.
Case 1. {x x }={ ξ ξ }. In this case, we know that C({ξ y ξ }) ={ y}. Contrary to
what we want to prove, suppose that C({ξ y z}) ={ ξ} for some z ∈ Y \{ ξ y}.I t m u s t
be that z  = ξ , and hence C({ξ z ξ }) ={ z}, by deﬁnition of ξ, ξ . Alternatively, the ﬁrst
statement of Lemma 7 implies that C({ξ z ξ }) ={ ξ}, hence the desired contradiction.
Case 2. {x x }∩{ ξ ξ }  =∅,b u t{x x }  ={ ξ ξ }. Suppose, for instance, that x = ξ
(the argument for the three other cases x = ξ , x  = ξ ,a n dx  = ξ is similar). We know
that C({ξ y x }) ={ y} and C({ξ x  ξ }) ={ x } (by deﬁnition of ξ, ξ ). Contrary to what
we want to prove, suppose that C({ξ y z}) ={ ξ} for some z ∈ Y \{ ξ y}.O b s e r v e t h a t
C({y x  ξ }) cannot be {y} because of the second statement of Lemma 7, and it can-
not be {ξ } to avoid a contradiction with the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7.T h e E C a x -
iom implies that C({y x  ξ }) ={ x }. The ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 now implies that
C({ξ y ξ }) ={ y}. Hence we can assume that z is different from ξ  and we know that
C({ξ z ξ }) ={ z} by deﬁnition of ξ, ξ . This leads to a contradiction with the ﬁrst state-
ment of Lemma 7, since C({ξ y z}) ={ ξ}.
Case 3. {x x }∩{ ξ ξ }=∅. Contrary to what we want to prove, suppose that
C({ξ y z}) ={ ξ} for some z ∈ Y \{ ξ y}.I fC({x x  ξ}) ={ ξ}, then we reach a contradic-
tion with C({ξ x ξ }) ={ x} and C({ξ x  ξ }) ={ x } via the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7.
Hence C({x x  ξ}) ={ x} or {x }. We consider only the ﬁrst case; the argument for
the second case is similar. The third statement of Lemma 7 implies C({x y ξ}) ={ x},
since C({x y x }) ={ y}.H e n c e C({ξ y ξ })  = {ξ}, as otherwise we get a contradiction
with the second statement of Lemma 7 (with x being in between both y and ξ,a n d
ξ and ξ , while ξ is in between y and ξ ). So z = ξ  is impossible. If z  = ξ ,t h e n156 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
C({ξ z ξ }) ={ z}. Combined with C({ξ y z}) ={ ξ}, the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 im-
plies that C({ξ y ξ }) ={ ξ}, a contradiction again.  
Proof of Lemma 3
Let z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) ={ w} and let x ∈ Bw. We are done with the ﬁrst part
of the statement after proving that either C({x w z}) ={ w} or C({x w z }) ={ w} (mean-
ing that we can actually choose y in {z z }). Notice ﬁrst that C({x w z}) must be a sin-
gleton by EC if C({x z}) ={ x z} or by ATT if C({x z}) is a singleton. A similar argument
implies that C({x w z }) is a singleton as well. Suppose now, contrary to what we want
to prove, that C({x w z}) ∈{ x z} and C({x w z }) ∈{ x z }. Notice that we must have
C({x w z}) = C({x w z }), as otherwise we would have a contradiction to Lemma 5
and RA (there is no way to select at most two elements out of {w x z z },t h a tl e a dt o
a nonempty intersection with three different singleton choices in three subsets of cardi-
nality 3). Hence it must be that both C({x w z}) and C({x w z }) equal {x}.I ti sn o td i f -
ﬁcult to check that this, combined C({z w z }) ={ w},i m p l i e st h a tC({w x z z }) ={ x}
or {w x}, againasaconsequenceofLemma5andRA.TheSYMaxiommakesthesecond
case impossible. Indeed, w does not belong to either C({x w z}) or C({x w z }),s ow e
are forced to conclude that C({w x z z }) ={ x}. But then we get a contradiction with
OC since x z z  ∈ Bw. We are thus done with the proof of the ﬁrst part of the statement.
As for the second part, let y y  ∈ Bw be such that C({x w y}) ={ w} and
C({x w y }) ={ w} .S u p p o s e ,c o n t r a r yt ow h a tw ew a n tt op r o v e ,t h a tx  1 y and y   1 x.
Notice that C({x y}) ={ x y}, as otherwise C({x w y}) ={ x} or {y} by ATT. Similarly,
C({x y }) ={ x y }.H e n c ey  2 x and x  2 y . By the induction hypothesis, C({x y y }) =
C
f
 ({x y y }).H e n c e C({x y y }) ={ x}. Combining this with C({x w y}) ={ w} and
C({x w y }) ={ w}, Lemma 5 and RA imply that C({w x y y }) ={ w} or {w x}.T h es e c -
ond case leads to a contradiction with SYM, and hence C({w x y y }) ={ w},b u tt h i s
leads to a contradiction with OC, since C({w x}) ={ w x}, C({x y}) ={ x y}, C({x y }) =
{x y },a n dC({y y }) ={ y y }. We are thus done with the proof of the second and last
part of the statement.
Proving Lemma 4
Lemma 8. Let C be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes SYM, RA, EFF, NBC, EC, and OC.
Supposethatthechoiceoutofanypairin {x y y } isthepair itselfand that C({x y y }) =
{x}.I fx ∈ Aw and y y  ∈ Bw,t h e nC({y y  w}) ={ w}.
Proof. The ATT axiom implies that C({x y w}) = C({x y  w}) ={ x}. Since
C({x y y }) ={ x}, it follows from Lemma 5, RA, and SYM that C({x y y  w}) ={ x}.T h e
ECaxiomimpliesthat C({y y  w}) isasingleton. If C({y y  w}) ={ y},thenw egetacon -
tradiction with OC, since C({x y}) ={ x y}. By a similar argument, C({y y  w})  = {y },
and hence C({y y  w}) ={ w}.  
Proof of Lemma 4. Assume, to the contrary, that there exist ξ ξ  ∈ Aw and y y  ∈ Bw
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C({ξ y})  = {y}, as otherwise we get a contradiction with y ∈ Bw via PC, since ξ ∈ Aw.
Hence C({ξ y}) ={ ξ y}. A similar argument implies that C({ξ  y }) ={ ξ  y }. By deﬁni-
tion of   on S,w eh a v e
ξ  1 y  y  2 ξ
(1)
y   1 ξ  ξ    2 y  
The proof proceeds by considering two cases.
Case 1. C({ξ y }) ={ ξ} and C({ξ  y}) ={ ξ }. By deﬁnition of  ,w eh a v eξ   y  and
ξ    y. Combining this with (1), it follows that ξ  1 y   1 ξ   1 y and ξ   2 y  2 ξ  2
y  (by the induction hypothesis, the two relations in   are transitive). Since C = C
f
 
on triplets in S,w ec o n c l u d et h a tC({ξ y y }) ={ ξ} and C({ξ  y y }) ={ ξ }.T h e A T T
axiom implies that C({w ξ y}) ={ ξ} and C({w ξ  y }) ={ ξ }, whereas EFF implies that
C({w ξ y }) ={ ξ} and C({w ξ  y}) ={ ξ }.T h eS Y Ma x i o m ,Lemma 5, and RA imply that
C({w ξ y y }) ={ ξ} and C({w ξ  y y }) ={ ξ }. This leads to a contradiction with OC
if C({w y y }) ={ y} or {y }, since y y  ∈ Bw, C({y y }) ={ y y }, C({ξ y}) ={ ξ y},a n d
C({ξ  y }) ={ ξ  y }. The EC axiom implies that C({w y y }) is a singleton, and hence
C({w y y }) ={ w}, but this contradicts the assumption of Lemma 4.H e n c e t h i s ﬁ r s t
case is impossible and we have to look into the second case.
Case 2. C({ξ y })  = {ξ} and/or C({ξ  y})  = {ξ }. We consider the case where
C({ξ y })  = {ξ}. A similar reasoning applies if C({ξ  y})  = {ξ }.T h ec a s eC({ξ y }) ={ y }
leads to a contradiction with y  ∈ Bw via PC, since ξ ∈ Aw.H e n c e C({ξ y }) ={ ξ y }.
If ξ  1 y , then by the induction hypothesis that C = C
f
  on pairs in S, it follows that
y   2 ξ.F r o m( 1) and the transitivity of the relations in  , it follows that ξ  1 y   1 ξ  and
ξ   2 y   2 ξ. The induction hypothesis also implies that C = C
f
  on triplets in S,a n d
hence C({ξ ξ  y }) ={ y }. On the other hand, ATT implies that C({w ξ y }) ={ ξ} and
C({w ξ  y }) ={ ξ }. There is no way to deﬁne C({w ξ ξ  y }) so as to satisfy Lemma 5
a n dR A .H e n c ei tm u s tb et h a ty   1 ξ. Since C = C
f
  on pairs in S,w eh a v et h a t
ξ  2 y .H e n c e ,y   1 ξ  1 y and y  2 ξ  2 y  by (1) and the transitivity of the relations
in  .A l s o , C = C
f
  on triplets in S, and hence C({ξ y y }) ={ ξ}. Lemma 8 implies
C({y y  w}) ={ w}, a contradiction with the assumption of Lemma 4. Case 2 is thus im-
possible as well.  
 ∗
1 and  ∗
2 are transitive
Transitivity is the subject of Lemmas 10 and 11. Before stating and proving these lem-
mas, we need to establish a useful property.
Lemma 9. Let C be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes ATT, NBC, RA, EFF, SYM, EC, PC,
and OC. Let x, y, z,a n dz  be four elements of X such that the solution out of any pair in
{x y z} is the pair itself, C({y z }) ={ y z },a n dC({z z }) ={ z }.T h e nC({x y z}) ={ y} if
and only if C({x y z }) ={ y}.158 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Proof. Notice that C({x z })  = {x}, as otherwise we get a contradiction with C({x z}) =
{x z} via PC, since C({z z }) ={ z }. Independently of whether C({x z }) ={ z } or {x z },
ATT implies that C({x z z }) = C({y z z }) ={ z }.
If C({x y z}) ={ y},t h e nLemma 5 and RA imply that C({x y z z }) ={ z } or {y z }.
The former case leads to a contradiction with OC. In the latter case, SYM implies that
z  / ∈ C({x y z }), since C({y z z }) ={ z }.B yA T T ,C({x z }) ={ z } implies C({x y z }) =
{z }, a contradiction. Hence C({x z }) ={ x z } a n dE Ci m p l i e st h a tC({x y z }) must be
a singleton or C({x y z }) ={ y} given RA, as desired.
If C({x y z }) ={ y},t h e nLemma 5 and RA imply that C({x y z z }) ={ y z }.
Lemma 6 implies in turn that C({x y z}) ={ y}, as desired.  
Lemma 10. Let ( 1  2) be two complete, transitive, and antireﬂexive orderings deﬁned
over S ⊆ X such that C = C
f
  on pairs and triplets in S,l e tw ∈ X \ S,l e t( ∗
1  ∗
2) be the
extensions of ( 1  2) as deﬁned in the main text, let x, y be two elements of S,a n dl e t
i ∈{ 1 2}.I fx  i y and y  ∗
i w,t h e nx  ∗
i w. Similarly, if w  ∗
i y and y  i x,t h e nw  ∗
i x.
Proof. The second statement is symmetric to the ﬁrst, so its proof is very similar and
is therefore omitted. We thus assume that x  i y and y  ∗
i w, and we want to prove that
x  ∗
i w.I fx ∈ Aw, then we are done. So we assume x ∈ Bw.
Supposethatthereisnoz z  ∈ Bw suchthatC({z w z }) ={ w}.I fy ∈ Aw,thenx  ∗
i w
by deﬁnition of  ∗
i . Suppose now that y ∈ Bw. Our construction of  ∗ is such that either
z  ∗
i w for all z ∈ Bw or w  ∗
i z for all z ∈ Bw.H e n c ex  ∗
i w, as desired. So from now on
we assume that there exist z z  ∈ Bw such that C({z w z }) ={ w}.
By Lemma 3,t h e r ee x i s t sx  ∈ Bw such that C({x w x }) ={ w}.I fx  i x ,t h e nx  ∗
i w
byconstructionandwearedone. Soweproveintheremainderthatx   i xisimpossible.
So we assume, on the contrary, that x   i x and x  −i x .
Supposeﬁrstthat y ∈ Aw.I nt h a tc a s e ,C({x y}) isdifferentfrom {x},asotherwisewe
get a contradiction with x ∈ Bw via PC. In addition, C({x y}) is different from {y}, since
x  i y and C = C
f
  on all pairs in S.H e n c eC({x y}) ={ x y}. Since C = C
f
  on all pairs
in S,w ec o n c l u d ey  −i x.G i v e nt h a tx   i x and x  −i x , the transitivity of   implies
that x   i y and y  −i x . Since C = C
f
  on all pairs in S,t h e nC({x  y}) ={ x  y}.G i v e n
that y ∈ Aw,A T Tn o wi m p l i e st h a tC({x y w}) = C({x  y w}) ={ y}. Since C = C
f
  on all
triplets in S, it follows that C({x  x y}) ={ x}. But because C({x w x }) ={ w}, there is no
way to deﬁne C({x x  y w}) so as to satisfy RA, given Lemma 5, and we get the desired
contradiction.
Suppose next that y ∈ Bw. Then it follows from y  ∗
i w that w  ∗
−i y by construction.
If C({x  y}) ={ x },t h e nx    y by construction, and hence x   y (by assumption for i and
by transitivity for −i). Since C = C
f
  on pairs in S,w ec o n c l u d et h a tC({x y}) ={ x}.T h e
ATT axiom implies that C({x y w}) ={ x} and C({x  y w}) ={ x }. It becomes impossible
to deﬁne C({x x  y w}) so as to satisfy RA and Lemma 5,g i v e nt h a tC({x x  w}) ={ w}.
So we must conclude that C({x  y})  = {x }, and hence C({x  y}) ={ x  y} since x   i y
(this follows from our assumptions that x  i y and x   i x, and from the transitivity
of  ). Suppose C({x y}) ={ x}. Note that C({w x}) ={ w x}, the choice from every
pair in {x  w y} is the pair itself, and the same is true for {x  w x}. It then followsTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Reason-based choice 159
from Lemma 9 that C({x  y w}) ={ w}, and we get a contradiction with y  ∗
i w, since
x   i y (see Lemma 3). As in the previous paragraph, we cannot have C({x y}) ={ y}
either, because x  i y.H e n c e C({x y}) ={ x y}.S o x   i x  i y and y  −i x  −i x ,
and C({x x  y}) ={ x} since C = C
f
  on triplets in S. In addition, we also know that
C({x  w x}) ={ w}. Since x  y∈ Bw and C({x  y}) ={ x  y},t h e nC({x  w y}) must be
a singleton by EC. If C({x  w y}) ∈{ x  y}, then there is no way to deﬁne C({x x  y w})
so as to satisfy Lemma 5 and RA. Hence, C({x  w y}) ={ w} and we get a contradiction
with y  ∗
i w, since x   i y (see Lemma 3).  
Lemma 11. Let ( 1  2) be two complete, transitive and antireﬂexive orderings deﬁned
over S ⊆ X such that C = C
f
  on pairs and triplets in S,l e tw ∈ X \ S,l e t( ∗
1  ∗
2) be the
extensions of ( 1  2) as deﬁned in the main text, let x and y be two elements of S,a n dl e t
i ∈{ 1 2}.I fx  ∗
i w and w  ∗
i y,t h e nx  i y.
Proof. We wish to show that x  i y.I f C({x y}) ={ x}, then we are done. Assume
C({x y})  = {x}.
We ﬁrst consider the case where x ∈ Aw.H e n c eC({x y})  = {y} or C({x y}) ={ x y},
since otherwise we get a contradiction with w  ∗
i y via PC. Now assume that the con-
clusion of the lemma is wrong, i.e., y  i x. Notice that there must exist y  ∈ Bw such
that C({y w y }) ={ w}, as otherwise y  ∗
i w by deﬁnition of  ∗, a contradiction. Since
w  ∗
i y,itmustbethaty   i y andy  −i y ,againbydeﬁnitionof ∗. Sincey  i x, x  −i y,
and C = C
f
  on triplets in S, it follows that C({x y y }) ={ y}.G i v e nt h a tw is added af-
ter y in our induction, it cannot be that C({w y}) ={ w}. Since w  ∗
i y, it cannot be that
C({w y}) ={ y} either. Hence y ∈ Bw. The ATT axiom implies that C({x w y}) ={ x},
but then there is no way to deﬁne C({x y y  w}) so as to satisfy Lemma 5 and RA. We,
therefore, conclude that x  i y, as desired.
Consider next the case where x ∈ Bw. As in the previous paragraph, y ∈ Bw.B y
our construction of  ∗, there must exist x  y  ∈ Bw such that C({x w x }) ={ w} and
C({y w y }) ={ w}. If this were not true, then w would be ranked above or below both x
and y according to  ∗
i , thereby contradicting our assumption that x  ∗
i w and w  ∗
i y.
Suppose that C({x y}) ={ y}. Lemma 9 implies that C({x  y w}) ={ w}. Since w  ∗
i y,
we must have x   i y.W em u s ta l s oh a v ex  i x , since C({x x  w}) ={ w} and x  ∗
i w.
Transitivity of  i implies that x  i y, as desired.
Suppose now that C({x y}) ={ x y} and that y  i x, contrary to what we want to
prove. Then y   i y  i x  i x  and x   −i x  −i y  −i y  so as to have x  ∗
i w and w  ∗
i y.
The solution out of any pair in {x y w} is the pair itself. So C({x y w}) is a singleton
b yE C .I tc a n n o tb ew, as this implies w  ∗
i x. Suppose that C({x y w}) ={ y}. Since
C({y w y }={ w}, the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 implies that C(x w y ) ={ w},h e n c e
a contradiction with x  ∗
i w, since y   i x. Suppose now that C({x y w}) ={ x}. Since
C({x w x }={ w}, the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 implies that C({x  y w}) ={ w},h e n c e
a contradiction with w  ∗
i y, since y  i x .  160 de Clippel and Eliaz Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
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